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CASE NOTES
Admiralty-Liability of Shipowner-Employer to Longshoreman Arising
Out of Unseaworthiness.-Petitioner, a longshoreman, was employed by Pan-
Atlantic Steamship Corporation, charterer of the steamship Yaka, to load cargo
on that vessel. While working in the hold, he fell and was injured because of
a hidden defect in a wooden pallet brought on board by Pan-Atlantic. He brought
a libel in rem against the Yaka, alleging unseaworthiness. The owner and claim-
ant of the vessel, Waterman Steamship Corporation, brought in Pan-Atlantic
as an additional defendant on the ground that at the time of the injury Pan-
Atlantic was operating the ship under a demise, or bareboat, charter, which
contained an express indemnity clause.' The trial court found that the peti-
tioner's injury was due to unseaworthiness and held that the Yaka was liable
in rem; that Waterman Steamship Corporation was liable as owner and claimant;
and that Pan-Atlantic was liable over to the shipowner.2 The court of appeals
reversed,3 holding that, as demisor, the shipowner was not personally liable for
unseaworthiness due to the acts of the demisee occurring subsequent to the
charter; 4 that the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Acts
thereinafter referred to as the Longshoremen's Act] excluded personal liability
on the employer's part, other than for compensation;0 and that there could be
no liability in rem without an underlying liability to support it.7 Certiorari was
granted8 to determine whether any personal liability is necessary to support the
1. A bareboat charterer, sometimes called a "special owner" or owner pro hac vice, has
all the duties and liabilities of an owner. E.g., United States v. Shea, 152 U.S. 178 (1894);
Leary v. United States, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 607, 610 (1871) (dictum). Two circuit courts
have held that giving a bareboat charter relieves the actual owner from liability for un-
seaworthiness arising after the demise. Pichirilo v. Guzman, 290 F.2d 812 (1st Cir. 1961),
rev'd on other grounds, 369 U.S. 698 (1962); Grillea v. United States, 229 F.2d 687 (2d
Cir.), rev'd on other grounds on rehearing, 232 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1956).
2. Reed v. The Yaka, 183 F. Supp. 69 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
3. 307 F.2d 203 (3d Cir. 1962).
4. See note 1 supra.
5. 44 Stat. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1958), as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 906-33
(Supp. IV, 1963).
6. "The term 'employer' means an employer any of whose employees are employed in
maritime employment, in whole or in part, upon the navigable wraters of the United States
(including any dry dock.)." 44 Stat. 1425 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 902(4) (1958). "The liability
of an employer prescribed in section 4 shall be exclusive and in place of all other
liability of such employer to the employee, his legal representative, husband or wife, parents,
dependents, next of kin, and anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages from such em-
ployer at law or in admiralty on account of such injury or death .... " 44 Stat. 1426 (1927),
33 U.S.C. § 905 (1958).
7. In support of its holding the court referred to Smith v. The Mormacdale, 198 F2d
849 (3d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 908 (1953); accord, Pichirilo v. Guzman, 290
F.2d 812 (1st Cir. 1961), rev'd on other grounds, 369 U.S. 698 (1962). Contra, Grillea v.
United States, 229 F.2d 687 (2d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds on rehearing, 232 F.2d 919
(2d Cir. 1956).
8. 371 U.S. 938 (1962).
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in rem liability of a ship.0 The Supreme Court, in reversing, expressly avoided
deciding whether, in the absence of personal liability, a ship could be held
liable, 10 and held that Pan-Atlantic's personal liability as shipowner for injuries
due to unseaworthiness of the vessel extended to longshoremen who were em-
ployed by the shipowner. Reed v. The Yaka, 373 U.S. 410 (1963).
The Longshoremen's Act was enacted to provide the protection of a compen-
sation scheme to longshoremen and harbor workers who are injured while on a
ship in navigable waters. While the liability of the employer was limited by the
statute to the compensation award," section 33 of the same act gave the em-
ployee the right to elect to bring an action for damages against a third person
who was liable for the injury, in lieu of seeking an award of compensation.
The statute was amended to permit an action after the acceptance of a com-
pensation award.' 2 This right to damages from third parties became especially
significant when the absolute liability of a shipowner for injury to longshoremen,
resulting from unseaworthiness of the vessel, was first defined by the Supreme
Court in Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki.'3 The Court noted that the obligation
of seaworthiness was founded not in contract, but on "the hazards of marine
service which unseaworthiness places on the men who perform it . . together
with their helplessness to ward off such perils and the harshness of forcing them
to shoulder alone the resulting personal disability and loss . . .,14
The Sieracki case started an inexorable pattern of extension of the unsea-
worthiness concept. In Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp.,16
the shipowner was held liable for the full amount of the unseaworthiness judg-
ment, although plaintiff's employer caused the injury. This ruling was followed
in Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn.'6 The concept of an unseaworthy condition
9. This question had been reserved in Guzman v. Pichirilo, 369 U.S. 698, 700 (1962).
10. Reed v. The Yaka, 373 U.S. 410, 412 (1963).
11. 44 Stat. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1958).
12. 73 Stat. 391 (1959), 33 U.S.C. § 933 (Supp. IV, 1963).
13. 328 U.S. 85 (1946). A longshoreman was injured when a defective shackle In the
ship's rigging broke and a boom fell on him. Although the defect had occurred during
manufacture of the piece, and was not discoverable by visual inspection, the shipowner
was held liable to the longshoreman.
14. Id. at 93. In explaining the applicability of this concept to longshoremen, the Court
noted the incongruity that a seaman and a longshoreman, working side by side on the same
job, would have greatly different remedies for the same injury. A strong dissent pointed out
that the special remedy given to seamen arises from the discipline and perils of the sea,
but a longshoreman is free to quit his job if he feels it is too hazardous. Id. at 104-05.
15. 342 U.S. 282 (1952). Halcyon Lines hired Haenn to make repairs on a ship moored
in navigable waters. Haenn's employee was injured, and brought suit against Halcyon
alleging unseaworthiness and negligence. Halcyon brought Haenn in as a third party de-
fendant for contribution. A judgment was given against Halcyon, but on the question of
relative degree of fault, a jury verdict of 75% was rendered against Haenn. On appeal, the
Supreme Court ordered the contribution proceeding dismissed, because the admiralty rule
of 50-50 contribution had previously been applied only to collision cases. "We have con-
cluded that it would be unwise to attempt to fashion new judicial rules of contribution and
that the solution of this problem should await congressional action." Id. at 285.
16. 346 U.S. 406 (1953). The Supreme Court affirmed a circuit court reversal of a
contribution award against Hawn's employer.
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was greatly extended in Alaska S.S. Co. v. Petterson,1 where the defect was
in a piece of equipment brought on board by the stevedore, respondent's em-
ployer. As a result the longshoreman was afforded an opportunity for a large
tort verdict against the shipowner when his employer was apparently negligent,
although an action directly against the employer was barred by the act.'8
This decision placed a heavy burden on the shipowner, in view of the little
control he exercises over extra equipment used by the stevedore. However, two
years later, in Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp.,'0 an injured
longshoreman's employer was held liable over to the shipowner for an in
personam judgment arising out of an unseaworthy condition created by the
employer's negligence. This decision completed the first circumvention of the
apparent intent of the act, in that it extended liability beyond the obligation to
pay compensation.20
Ryan was extended in Crumady v. The Joachim Hcndrik Fisser,2 where
the stevedores operated ship equipment found to be unsafe. The Court said
17. 347 U.S. 396 (1954) (per curiam), affirming 205 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1953),
rehearing denied, 347 U.S. 994 (1954). The injury was caused by a defective snatch block,
a portable piece of rigging. The testimony was unclear regarding the ownership of the block.
The court of appeals considered this fact in the light most favorable to the shipowner, i.e.,
that it had been brought on board by the stevedore, and then found the shipowner abso-
lutely liable. The Supreme Court affirmed in a per curiam decision. Mr. Justice Burton,
joined by Justices Frankfurter and Jackson, dissented, holding that this %%as an unwarranted
extension of the shipowner's absolute liability, since prior unseaworthiness cases all referred
to defects in the ship or its equipment; here the shipowner neither owned nor controlled the
defective device. 347 U.S. at 401-02.
18. See note 6 supra.
19. 350 U.S. 124 (1956). Ryan Stevedoring Company agreed to do all the stevedoring
for Pan-Atlantic, without a formal contract or express indemnity agreement. Ryan's employee
was injured by unsafely stowed cargo. He collected compensation and then sued Pan-At-
lantic, alleging unseaworthiness or failure to furnish a safe place to work. Pan-Atlantic filed
a third-party complaint against Ryan. A directed judgment for Pan-Atlantic was affirmed
by an equally divided Court in 349 U.S. 901 (1955). On rehearing, the Court held that the
Longshoremen's Act did not preclude liability, because the liability was based on contract-
an obligation to stow cargo in a reasonably safe manner. Competence and safe stowage
were held to be inescapable elements of the service undertaken. Although one of the ship's
officers had an obligation to supervise stowage, his failure to discover and correct the con-
tractor's own breach of warranty was not permitted as a defense. The opinion noted that,
although the act gives a quid pro quo to the employee for his loss of right to sue for more
than compensation from the employer, "the Act prescribes no quid pro quo for a shipowner
that is compelled to pay a judgment obtained against it for the full amount of a longshore-
man's damages." 350 U.S. at 129. (Italics omitted.)
20. The employer's effective personal liability for negligence to his employee was no
longer limited in all cases to compensation, even though the employer remained absolutely
liable for injuries sustained by the longshoreman in the course of employment while on
board ship.
21. 358 U.S. 423 (1959). The electrical cutoff for one of the ship's winches was set at
six tons, although the winch was only rated to lift three tons. There was a conflict in the
testimony as to the safety of this practice. The stevedores then operated the vinch with
the boom extended improperly, and part of the rigging broke.
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that "the negligence of the stevedores, which brought the unseaworthiness of
the vessel into play, amounted to a breach of the warranty of workmanlike
service .... ,"22
In the instant case the Court declined to decide the validity of the circuit
court's holding that there could be no liability in rem since there was no liability
in personam to support it.23 Instead, following the pattern of liberal construction
of the Longshoremen's Act and admiralty law established in Sieracki and the
cases following it, the Court held that Pan-Atlantic was liable in personam for
injury caused by unseaworthiness. 24 Mr. Justice Black, writing for the majority,
stated that it had been previously held that the act "was not intended to take
away from longshoremen the traditional remedies of the sea, so that recovery
for unseaworthiness could be had notwithstanding the availability of compen-
sation" 25 even though the recovery was from the employer. The Court's guide
for interpretation was that "the Longshoremen's Act 'must be liberally con-
strued in conformance with its purpose, and in a way which avoids harsh and
incongruous results.' "20 Mr. Justice Black stressed the harshness and incongru-
ity of forcing the petitioner to settle for a compensation award because he
worked for the shipowner, whereas if he were employed by an independent
stevedore he would not be so limited.27
Mr. Justice Harlan, joined in his dissent by Mr. Justice Stewart, argued that
"the Court has effectively 'repealed' a basic aspect of the Longshoremen's
. . . Act."28 Quoting the language of the act, he felt that the Court's decision
ran counter to the plain meaning of the words of section 5 of the statute, which
provides that "the liability of an employer prescribed in section 4 shall be
exclusive .. ".. 29 Relying on the dissent in Ryan, Mr. Justice Harlan inter-
preted the broad exclusion clause literally.30 He contended that the result in
Ryan "can be squared with the statute, resting as it did on the stevedoring
company's voluntarily assumed contractual obligation to indemnify the third-
party shipowner, while the present result cannot."''3 He attacked the validity of
22. Id. at 429.
23. 373 U.S. at 412.
24. "[T]he Court of Appeals erred in holding that Pan-Atiantic could not be held per-
sonally liable for the unseaworthiness of the ship which caused petitioner's injury." Ibid.
25. 373 U.S. at 413.
26. Id. at 415, quoting Voris v. Eikel, 346 U.S. 328, 333 (1953). In that case the Court
upheld the claim for compensation of an illiterate longshoreman who was permanently In-
jured on the job under circumstances which gave actual notice of the injury to his super-
visor. The longshoreman then failed to give the written notice of injury required by the act.
27. 373 U.S. at 415.
28. Id. at 416.
29. 44 Stat. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1958).
30. "'[W]hile Congress imposed absolute liability on employers, they were also accorded
counterbalancing advantages. . . . Under no circumstances were they to be held liable to
their own employees for more than the compensation clearly fixed in the Act.'" 373 U.S. at
418, quoting Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124, 140 (1956)
(dissenting opinion).
31. 373 U.S. at 418. Gilmore & Black, Admiralty 369 n.372 (1957), compares various
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the "incongruous result" argument, pointing out that "any anomaly . . . should
be left to Congress to remedy, for it may be that it would choose means wholly
different from those chosen by the Court. There is an outer limit beyond which
judicial construction of the language of a statute ought not go . . . .,2 The
majority of the Court seemed to take too broad an approach in interpreting
congressional intent. While the congressional reportsm emphasized a desire to
extend the protection of the compensation scheme to the employees, each report
also contained a reference to consideration of the rights of the employer.34
A more complete exposition of congressional intent can be found in a 1959
congressional report on an amendment to the act35 which stated that the act
"involves a relinquishment of certain legal rights by employees in return for a
similar surrender of rights by employers. . . . Employers are assured that re-
gardless of fault their liability to an injured workman is limited under the act."'0
The report distinguishes clearly the liability of an employer from that of a third
party, from whom damages can be recovered. 37
Despite this apparently clear expression of congressional intent in enacting
section 5, the employer of a longshoreman or harbor worker may now incur a
double liability. The employee can maintain an action for damages against his
employer under the unseaworthiness doctrine, after or while collecting a compen-
sation award.38 This is true if the employer is responsible for, or merely brings
into play,39 an unseaworthy condition of the vessel, and, while on the vessel,40
compensation schemes, noting that most state statutes permit recovery in the form of an
indemnity from an employer, for breach of an independent duty to a third party or
if there is a basis for finding an implied promise of indemnity. See also 2 Larson, Workmen's
Compensation Law § 76.00 (1961).
32. 373 U.S. at 419. Mr. Justice Harlan's conclusion is strikingly similar to the majority
opinion in Halcyon Lines. See note 15 supra.
33. H.R. Rep. No. 1190, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1926); S. Rep. No. 973, 69th Cong., 1st
Sess. 16 (1926).
34. "The committee . . . endeavored to decide the points of difference with equity and
fairness to both the employer and the employee." H.R. Rep. No. 1190, 69th Cong., Ist Sess.
3 (1926). "Sections (4), (5), and (6) of the bill contain the appropriate provisions for ...
abolishing liability on the part of the employer except for the payment of the prescribed
compensation .... " S. Rep. No. 973, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1926).
35. S. Rep. No. 428, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1959). This report was concerned with an
amendment (subsequently enacted) to the Longshoremen's Act to permit an employee to
bring suit against a third party in his own name within six months of accepting comapensa-
tion. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
36. Ibid.
37. "Section 5 of the Longshoremen's Act makes the statutory liability of an employer
the exclusive liability for injury to an employee arising out of employment. This section
also reserves to the employee the right to recover damages against third parties causing
injury." Ibid.
38. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
39. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
40. A stevedore's double liability probably extends also to cases where a longshoreman
on the pier is injured because of an unseaworthy condition of the vessel for which the
stevedore is responsible. The stevedore is liable for compensation under the applicable state
1963]
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the longshoreman or harbor worker is injured as a result of the condition. It is
no longer relevant whether the employer is the shipowner,41 charterer or indepen-
dent contractor.42
In applying the instant decision a problem may arise concerning the amount
of the judgment. It can be argued that the Court's "conclusion""4 means that
there exists only sufficient liability in personam to support an in rem action,
and the liability is limited to the value of the vessel. Conversely, the language
used in the opinion44 may mean that the employer is personally liable for the
full amount regardless of the value of the vessel.
Constitutional Law-Counsel for Indigents in Noncapital Felony Cases
Held Constitutionally Guaranteed.-Petitioner, an indigent defendant in a
Florida state court charged with a felony, requested appointment of counsel.
The request was denied and he was compelled to conduct his own trial defense.
Upon conviction and denial of relief by the state supreme court, the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari. The Court appointed counsel for the
petitioner and requested the parties to submit briefs discussing specifically
whether the holding of Betts v. Brady' should be reconsidered. On review the
Court overruled Betts and stated that the right to counsel for one charged with
a crime is fundamental and essential, and held that an indigent defendant in a
state criminal prosecution has the right to have counsel appointed. Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).2
compensation law. See Swanson v. Marra Bros., 328 U.S. 1 (1946). The ship Is liable In
rem for unseaworthiness resulting in injury to a longshoreman on the pier. Gutierrez v.
Waterman S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206 (1963). Applying the reasoning of the Instant case or
Ryan, the stevedore will be liable for any judgment resulting from the longshoreman's suit,
either directly as shipowner, or indirectly through liability over to the shipowner.
41. In the instant case, after comparing the duties and obligations of a bareboat charterer
to those of a shipowner, the Court spoke throughout the opinion primarily of the "ship-
owner's" liabilities and obligations.
42. Theoretically, the contractor might be able to escape liability through a disclaimer
clause in the contract. Since this would then leave the shipowner to shoulder any claims, it
is not likely that any such contracts will be written.
43. "We conclude that petitioner was not barred by the Longshoremen's Act from re-
lying on Pan-Atlantic's liability as a shipowner for the Yaka's unseaworthiness in order to
support his libel in rem against the vessel." 373 U.S. at 415-16. (Italics omitted.)
44. See note 24 supra.
1. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
2. The decision appears to limit this constitutional right to the trial. It stated that "In
deciding as it did-that 'appointment of counsel is not a fundamental right, essential to a
fair trial'--the Court in Betts v. Brady made an abrupt break with its own . . . precedents.
In returning to these old precedents .. . we but restore constitutional principles established
to achieve a fair system of justice." 372 U.S. 335, 343-44 (1963). (Italics omitted.) This Is
bolstered by the fact that petitioner alleged "that at his trial on a felony information he
was insolvent and requested the assistance of counsel." Gideon v. Wainwright, 153 So. 2d 299
(Fla. Sup. Ct. 1963).
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In Powell v. Alabama3 the Supreme Court held that failure to appoint coun-
sel "in a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ counsel, and
is incapable of adequately making his own defense" 4 was a denial of due proc-
ess under the fourteenth amendment.6 The Court expressly limited its holding
to a capital case.6 Subsequently, Avery v. Alabama,7 also a capital case, rein-
forced Powell. The Court stated that because of the "peculiar sacredness" of
the right to counsel, it must be protected.8
The Powell doctrine appeared to have been broadened to include noncapital
cases under the peculiar facts of Smith v. O'Grady? where the Court stated
that lack of counsel, coupled with the practice of deception by the prosecution
to obtain a plea of guilty, if proven, would be a denial of due process.10
Against this background the Court decided Betts v. Brady," wherein an in-
digent indicted for robbery was refused appointment of counsel and upon con-
viction sought habeas corpus relief on the ground that he had been deprived of
his constitutional right to assistance of counsel.'- The Supreme Court held that
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment did not impose upon the states
the duty to appoint counsel for indigents in noncapital cases 3 in the absence of
"special circumstances." 14 The court in Betts concluded that no such circum-
stances were shown, pointing out that the accused was a man of ordinary intelli-
gence and, having previously been in court as a defendant, could conduct his
own defense. 5 Mr. Justice Black, joined by Justices Douglas and Murphy in
dissent, argued that only counsel can guarantee the safeguards of a fair and full
trial and asserted that the fourteenth amendment incorporated the sixth and
made it applicable to the states.' 6
Subsequent to Betts a dear distinction arose between capital and non-capital
crimes at the state level. Cases involving capital crimes were decided under the
rationale of Powell,'7 while noncapital cases were controlled by Betts and its
3. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
4. Id. at 71.
5. The Court stated that in a capital case "the necessity of counsel was so vital and
imperative that the failure of the trial court to make an effective appointment of counsel
was . . . a denial of due process .. . !" Ibid.
6. "Whether this would be so in other criminal prosecutions, or under other circum-
stances, we need not determine." Ibid.
7. 308 US. 444 (1940).
8. Id. at 447.
9. 312 U.S. 329 (1941). In this case, defendant was promised by the prosecutor that if
he would waive counsel and plead guilty to burglary, he would be given a light sentence.
He complied with the request, but still received twenty years.
10. Id. at 334.
11. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
12. Id. at 457.
13. Id. at 473.
14. Id. at 462.
15. Id. at 472.
16. Id. at 474-76.
17. Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962) ; Brown v. Mississppi, 297 U.. 278 (1936);
Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82 (1934); United States ex rel. Tillery v. Cavell, 294 F.2d
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"special circumstances" rule. However, decisions following Betts considered so
wide a variety of factors under the "special circumstances" rule that while
the "rule has continued to exist in form ...its substance [has] been substan-
tially and steadily eroded."' s
Shortly before Betts, in reviewing state noncapital criminal cases, the Supreme
Court found that both the nature of the charge10 and the character of the de-
fense 20 may constitute special circumstances requiring counsel. In Wade v.
Mayo21 the Court again widened the scope of the special circumstances rule.
There an eighteen year old2 2 was denied counsel in a trial for burglary. The
Court found that the petitioner's age constituted a special circumstance and
stated that where, because of age, ignorance or lack of mental capacity, a de-
fendant cannot adequately represent himself, refusal to appoint counsel is a
denial of due process.23 In Uveges v. Pennsylvania2 4 the Court reached the
same conclusion when considering a similar factual situation.
The difficulty of application and the subjectiveness of the "special circum-
stances" rule in noncapital cases became evident when the Court reviewed two
cases involving relatively similar facts 25 and came to diametrically opposed
conclusions. In Gryger v. Burke,26 the petitioner alleged that failure to apprise
him of the right to counsel and an improper sentence by the trial judge2 7 consti-
tuted a denial of rights. The Court failed to find special circumstances justify-
ing relief and indicated that the petitioner's long familiarity with the courts
12 (3d Cir. 1961); Holly v. Smyth, 280 F.2d 536 (4th Cir. 1960); Melanson v. O'Brien, 191
F.2d 963 (1st Cir. 1951) ; Edwards v. United States, 139 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1943) ; Beckett
v. Hudspeth, 131 F.2d 195 (10th Cir. 1942); Achtien v. Dowd, 117 F.2d 989 (7th Cir. 1941).
18. 372 U.S. at 350.
19. Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786 (1945). The case concerned lack of jurisdiction as a
defense to the charge of robbery and the Court held it beyond the capacity of defendant
(an illiterate Winnebago Indian) to recognize this defense and reversed for lack of counsel.
It is interesting to note that the Court stated that the question of jurisdiction was a "prob-
lem obviously beyond the capacity of even an intelligent and educated layman." Id. at 789.
20. De Meerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 663 (1947). A seventeen year old was convicted of
murder in Michigan (a noncapital offense in that state) without benefit of counsel, and the
Supreme Court reversed the conviction on grounds that the complex and serious nature of
the charge required counsel.
21. 334 U.S. 672 (1948).
22. It should be noted that the defendant had a record of prior conviction. Id. at 683.
23. Id. at 684.
24. 335 U.S. 437 (1948). It is difficult to see that the Betts Court contemplated that
mere youth and inexperience would constitute special circumstances so shocking to the uni-
versal sense of justice as to require the reversal of state court convictions. Moreover, Mr.
Justice Reed gave a sign of the growing dissatisfaction with the Betts decision when he
pointed out that some of the Court thought the fourteenth amendment demanded counsel
in all serious state criminal trials.
25. Both cases involved the sentencing of a person defending himself without counsel
against a charge of burglary.
26. 334 U.S. 728 (1948).
27. The trial judge mistakenly believed a life sentence to be mandatory under the
Pennsylvania Habitual Criminals Act. Id. at 729-31.
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gave him ample experience with which to know his rights and conduct his own
defense.28 Subsequently, in Townsend v. Burke,2 9 petitioner's almost identical
allegations30 were found to be special circumstances requiring representation by
counsel. The Court stated that had counsel been present, he "would have been
under a duty to prevent the court from proceeding on .. . false assump-
tions."131
The Betts rationale became completely eroded under the holdings of the
Court in Hudson v. North Carolina32 and Carnley v. Cochran. 3 In the former,
the action of the codefendant in pleading guilty and withdrawing his attorney
was held to be a "special circumstance" unfair to the defendant.34 In the latter,
the very question of law involved was held a sufficient circumstance to demand
counsel.35
Hamilton v. Alabama3 extended both Powell and Betts by requiring counsel
on request at the arraignment as well as the trial. The Court held that failure
to appoint counsel at arraignment on the indictment in a capital case in Alabama
was denial of due process.3 7
Although Betts was not precisely "an abrupt break . . .with ...well-con-
sidered precedents, '38 as was charged by Mr. Justice Black, nevertheless it ig-
nored the prior trend typified by Mr. Justice Sutherland's statement in Powell.
He contended that the right to counsel is fundamental to a fair trial because
"without it, though [the layman] ... be not guilty, he faces the danger of con-
viction because he does not know how to establish his innocence." 39 The instant
case was an affirmation of what was truly existing law through the erosion of
Betts, and an elimination of any further verbal acknowledgment of the "special
circumstances" doctrine. The Court also formally eradicated the illogical distinc-
tion between trials of capital and noncapital cases.
The Court left unanswered, however, the question of whether the holding is
28. Id. at 730.
29. 334 U.S. 736 (1948).
30. Petitioner alleged denial of due process due to an absence of counsel and the judge's
erroneous impression as to his prior criminal record. Id. at 740-41.
31. Id. at 740.
32. 363 U.S. 697 (1960).
33. 369 U.S. 506 (1962).
34. 363 U.S. at 703.
35. 369 U.S. at 506.
36. 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
37. The Court based its decision on the importance of an arraignment in that state.
"Whatever may be the function and importance of arraignment in other jurisdictions ...
in Alabama it is a critical stage in a criminal proceeding." Id. at 54. The Court intimated
that whenever the arraignment involved important steps incidental to the conduct of the
trial, failure to appoint counsel would be critical. Ibid. The case dealt with arraignment on
indictment. The Court left open the question of whether the holding was limited to the
facts or also applied to a post-arrest arraignment before a magistrate.
38. 372 U.S. at 344. Powell and Avery were capital cases. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458 (1938), was limited to federal courts.
39. 287 U.S. at 69.
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applicable to all criminal cases, 40 or, as Mr. Justice Harlan in his concurring
opinion intimated, to cases which "carry the responsibility of a substantial
prison term." 41 He stated that "whether the rule should extend to all criminal
cases need not now be decided." 42 If in fact the latter be the case, it raises the
question of what criteria are to be used in determining substantiality. If the Court
follows its precedent in Ker v. California,43 wherein it directed that reasonable-
ness of searches and seizures 44 is to be judged by the same constitutional
standards as apply in the federal system, 45 uniformity will result. If, on the
other hand, determination of substantiality is left to the vagaries of fifty state
courts, the confusion which existed prior to the instant case will not be elimi-
nated. Furthermore, stating the rule in terms of its application to all felonies, or
to all felonies and misdemeanors, will not help if the definitions of these terms
vary from state to state.
Mr. Justice Black's reference to the Powell Court as having limited its hold-
ing to the facts of the case, "as this Court frequently does,"'40 may have
been intended to suggest that the new rule will apply only to felony prosecu-
tions. This would refute Mr. Justice Harlan's contentions. It is perhaps per-
missible to conclude from that statement that as Powell should not have been
limited to its facts, neither will the instant case. Should such be the case, all
crimes, regardless of the substantiality of imprisonment, would require appoint-
ment of counsel. This interpretation would avoid the problem posed above, but
would create equally serious new problems; e.g., would the right to counsel
extend to traffic cases and summary offenses for which incarceration may be im-
posed?
A further question remains unanswered. It is not clear when the right to
counsel will attach.47 It has been suggested that appointment of counsel should
be available to an indigent at precisely the same time a defendant with financial
resources would retain legal counsel.48 If the indigent is to be afforded the same
protection given to an accused with financial resources, it would appear that this
must be the ultimate result.40
40. -Mr. Justice Clark in his concurring opinion intimated that this decision would apply
to all crimes. He stated that "the Sixth Amendment requires appointment of counsel In
'all criminal prosecutions' .... ." He added that "the Fourteenth Amendment requires due
process of law for the deprival of 'liberty' just as for deprival of 'life,' and there cannot
constitutionally be a difference in the quality of the process based merely upon a supposed
difference in the sanction involved." 372 U.S. at 348-49.
41. Id. at 351.
42. Ibid.
43. 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
44. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
45. 374 U.S. at 34.
46. 372 U.S. at 343.
47. See Beaney, Right to Counsel Before Arraignment, 45 Minn. L. Rev. 771 (1961).
48. See Beaney, The Right to Counsel: Past, Present and Future, 49 Va. L. Rev. 1150
(1963). The author suggests that "if appointment is not made with arraignment on the
plea, the defense will be handicapped even if a postponement of the date of trial is possible."
Id. at 1158.
49. It has been recommended that "the interests of the financially disadvantaged accused
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Perhaps more important than the decision in the instant case is the possible
effect on prior decisions holding that the refusal to appoint counsel was not a
denial of due process. The question has been raised as to whether the instant
case should be given retrospective effect. A Pennsylvania state court"0 denied
such effect. The rationale of its decision was questionable."' Precedent exists for
retrospective application, for the Court in Eskridge v. Washington State BdV2
gave such effect to its holding in Griffin v. Illinois.53 There the Court held that
failure to furnish a transcript of the trial to an indigent at state expense to
effectuate appeal was a denial of due process. This is inconsistent with recent
state court and federal district court pronouncements limiting the application of
Mapp v. Ohio54 to cases pending at the time of the Supreme Court decision. 5
and the demands of orderly procedure at the preliminary stages require that counsel
be appointed for the accused not later than at his first appearance before the ... Commis-
sioner. If, of course, the defendant is brought first before the court . . .the judge should
appoint counsel at that time." Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Poverty
and the Administration of Federal Criminal Justice 37-38 (1963). This report refers to the
federal system, but would be equally applicable to state actions.
50. McCray v. Rundle, - Pa. D.&C.2d - (C.P. 1963).
51. The Court felt that the instant case should not be given retrospective effect for the
reason that it had previously held, in Commonwealth v. Mancini, 198 Pa. Super. 642, 184
A.2d 279 (1962), that Mapp v. Ohio should only be applied prospectively. See also United
States ex rel. Emerick v. Denno, 220 F. Supp. 890 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Commonwealth ex rel.
Wilson v. Rundle, 412 Pa. 109, 194 A.2d 143 (1963). State courts generally have limited
application of Mapp to cases where appeal was pending at the time of that decision. See
Moore v. State, 146 So. 2d 734 (Ala. Ct. App. 1962); Shorey v. State, 227 Md. 385, 177
A.2d 245 (1962) ; State v. Long, 71 N.J. Super. 583, 177 A.2d 609 (Essex County CL 1962);
People v. Muller, 11 N.Y.2d 154, 182 N.E.2d 99, 227 N.Y.S.2d 421 (1962). The federal
courts, however, are divided on the question. See Hall v. Warden, 313 F.2d 483 (4th Cir.
1963), where the court of appeals for the fourth circuit, sitting en banc, held that Mapp
should be applied retrospectively; and United States ex rel. McCrea v. La Vallee, 219 F.
Supp. 917 (N.D.N.Y. 1963), where the district court in the second circuit denied retrospective
effect. The effect of Mapp therefore is unsettled and hence it is weak authority for formu-
lating any decision as to the retrospective effect of Gideon. For a full discussion of the prob-
lem see Bender, The Retroactive Effect of an Overruling Constitutional Decision: Mapp v.
Ohio, 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 650 (1962).
52. 357 U.S. 214 (1958) (per curiam). The Court rejected Mir. Justice Frankfurter's
argument in his concurring opinion in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 25 (1956). He con-
tended that the holding in Griffin should be given prospective effect only. The court in
Eskridge ignored this and held that an indigent defendant denied a state financed transcript
in 1935 was entitled to release on habeas corpus.
53. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
54. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
55. See note 48 supra. In Great No. Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932),
the Supreme Court upheld a ruling by the Supreme Court of Montana giving retrospective
effect to a ruling by the Railroad Commission of Montana. It appears, however, that the
Court's decision was based on the statute in question giving the Board, on the complaint
of the shipper or carrier, the power to make equitable changes in the sipping rates. Id. at
359.
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Criminal Law-Constutionality of Statute Which Permits Conviction of
Misdemeanor by Nonunanimous Court Challenged on Ground That Dis-
sent Evidenced Reasonable Doubt As to Guilt.-Defendant was convicted of
indecent exposure of person' and impairment of the morals of a minor,2 both
misdemeanors. The case was tried before a panel of three judges. One judge
dissented on the ground that he had a reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt.
A motion was made to set aside the conviction on the grounds that defendant's
guilt had not been established beyond a reasonable doubt and that conviction of
a crime by two of three judges is unconstitutional. The court denied the motion
but stated that a serious question had been raised requiring resolution by an
appellate tribunal. People v. Scijo, 40 Misc. 2d 110, 242 N.Y.S.2d 986 (New
York City Crim. Ct. 1963).
The instant case is one of first impression in New York. Although nonunani-
mous conviction by a panel of judges has been authorized in New York under
colonial and state law since 1744,4 the constitutional validity of such a provision
has never been decided. The present statute, which governs the New York City
Criminal Court, provides:
When a part of the court is held by a panel of three of the judges thereof, any
determination, order or judgment of two of them shall be the determination, order
or judgment of the court .... 
The Criminal Court of the City of New York has jurisdiction over all mis-
demeanors (except libel) and offenses committed within the city of New
York. 6 All trials before the court are without a jury.7 A defendant may make
1. N.Y. Pen. Law § 1140.
2. N.Y. Pen. Law § 483.
3. The court gave two reasons for its denial. First, the state is entitled to the benefit
of any doubt a trial judge may have on the law. See People v. Busco, 46 N.Y.S.2d 859 (Ct.
Spec. Sess. 1942); People v. Richter, 182 Misc. 96, 43 N.Y.S.2d 114 (Magis. Ct. 1943).
Second, all doubts should be resolved, if possible, in favor of the constitutionality of
an act. See Johnson v. City of New York, 274 N.Y. 411, 9 N.E.2d 30 (1937). People v.
Scifo, 40 Misc. 2d 110, 115-16, 242 N.YS.2d 980, 986 (New York City Crim. Ct. 1963).
4. 3 Colonial Laws of New York, ch. 767, p. 380 (1744). The provision applied to
misdemeanors, breaches of the peace and other crimes of lesser degree than grand larceny
committed within the city and county of New York. Trial was to be before a panel of
magistrates, and judgment by a majority of them was sufficient for conviction. Essentially
the same provision was enacted by the State of New York in 1787. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1787,
ch. 65.
S. N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. Act § 42(4). (Emphasis added.)
6. N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. Act § 31. The court has been given jurisdiction over "crimes and
other violations of law, other than those prosecuted by indictment." N.Y. Const. art. VI,
§ 15.
7. N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. Act § 40. Provision for trial without a jury is expressly authorized
by the New York Constitution. "The legislature . . . may authorize any court which shall
have jurisdiction over crimes and other violations of law, other than crimes prosecuted by
indictment, to try such matters without a jury. . . ." N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 18. This section
has been held to modify N.Y. Const. art. I, § 2, which provides that "trial by jury In all
cases in which it has heretofore been guaranteed by constitutional provision shall remain
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application to the New York Supreme Court for a jury trial,8 but the grant-
ing of this application is within the absolute discretion of the courtY Ordi-
narily a defendant will be tried in the criminal court by a single judge, but
when charged with a misdemeanor he may elect to be tried by a three-judge
panel.'
0
On the other hand, the principle that a defendant's guilt must be established
beyond a reasonable doubt before he can be convicted of a crime has been
the common-law rule for centuries." In New York, the rule has been codified
in Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure:
A defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent until the contrary
be proved; and in case of a reasonable doubt whether his guilt is satisfactorily
shown, he is entitled to an acquittal.3'
The joint construction of this statute and the statute authorizing a two-to-
one decision by a panel of judges forms the basic problem raised by the in-
stant case. Does the "reasonable doubt" statute require unanimity of verdict,
and, if so, does it apply to the New York City Criminal Court? If it does
apply, is there a conflict with the "two-to-one decision" statute? Finally, is
the "two-to-one decision" statute constitutional?
inviolate forever . .. ," and to permit trials without juries in the court of special sessions,
predecessor of the Criminal Court of New York City. People v. Erickson, 302 N.Y. 461,
99 N.E.2d 240 (1951); People v. Bellinger, 269 N.Y. 265, 199 N.E. 213 (1935); People
ex rel. Frank v. McCann, 253 N.Y. 221, 170 N.E. 898 (1930).
8. N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. Act § 32. "The court, however, shall be divested of jurisdiction to
proceed with . .. any charge of misdemeanor . . . (b) if before the commencement of such
trial a judge or justice of a court having jurisdiction to try indictments ... shall certify
* . . that such charge of misdemeanor shall be prosecuted by indictment." Ibid.
9. People v. Satterthwaite, 195 Misc. 33, 91 N.Y.S.2d 597 (Sup. Ct. 1949); People
v. Hughes, 161 Misc. 405, 292 N.Y. Supp. 483 (Ct. Gen. Sess.), aff'd mem., 251 App. Div.
807, 298 N.Y. Supp. 188 (1st Dep't 1937). These cases were decided under the former
New York City Criminal Courts Act § 31(1)(c) (N.Y. Sess. Laws 1910, ch. 659), which
provided that a jury trial could be had if "before the commencement of any such trial, a
justice of the supreme court . . . shall certify that it is reasonable that such charge shall be
prosecuted by indictment." This provision is essentially the same as the present statute. See
note 8 supra. The grounds usually set forth in this application are that the case presents:
"(1) intricate questions of fact; (2) difficult questions of law; (3) property rights of the
defendants; (4) important matters of general interest to the entire legal profession; (5) that
conviction will be followed by disbarment proceedings ... " People v. Hughes, supra at
407, 292 N.Y. Supp. at 488.
10. N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. Act § 40.
11. Thayer, Evidence at the Common Law 552-53 (1898). In Coffin v. United States, 156
U.S. 432 (1894), the Supreme Court traced the origins of presumption of innocence to
early Greek and Roman law.
12. Courts have expressed this rule as requiring: "evidence which excluded every other
reasonable hypothesis," People v. Orr, 243 App. Div. 394, 395, 277 N.Y. Supp. 294, 295-
96 (1st Dep't 1935); "facts ... clearly ... inconsistent with innocence," People v.
Pfingst, 1 Misc. 2d 890, 895, 148 N.Y.S.2d 640, 647 (Magis. Ct. 1956); and that "if
there is the slightest doubt as to guilt, then the accused person must be acquitted," People v.
Matthews, 4 Misc. 2d 278, 279, 155 N.Y.S.2d 873, 875 (Tioga County CL 1956).
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The court here indicated that the reasonable doubt rule requires the exclu-
sion of such doubt from the minds of each of the triers of fact,13 i.e., that
the verdict of the panel of judges must be unanimous. This seems logically
preferable to the position that reasonable doubt need only be excluded from
the minds of a majority of the triers of fact. While this point has not been
authoritatively settled in New York in the case of a panel of judges, it has
been stated that the reasonable doubt rule compels a unanimous jury verdict. 4
It has also been held that the "unanimity of a verdict in a criminal case is
inextricably interwoven with the required measure of proof.""' Since the
reasonable doubt rule compels a unanimous jury verdict, it should certainly
compel a unanimous verdict by a panel of judges. For if a judge, who is
experienced and learned in the rules of evidence, can give a reason for his
doubt, the prosecution surely has not discharged its burden of proof. 1
The "reasonable doubt" rule is a rule of evidence, and except for con-
stitutionally protected rights, "the Legislature has the power to alter or create
any rule of EvIdence."'17 For example, in People v. Johnson,18 the leading
New York case for this proposition, it was held that the due process clause
of the state constitution did not prevent the legislature from changing the
common-law rule of evidence with respect to the competency of witnesses.1"
A later case, People ex rel. Woronoff v. Mallon,20 expressly stated that the
13. 40 Misc. 2d at 114, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 985.
14. People v. Light, 285 App. Div. 496, 138 N.Y.S.2d 262 (4th Dep't 1955). Accord,
Billeci v. United States, 184 F.2d 394, 403 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (dictum).
15. Hibdon v. United States, 204 F.2d 834, 838 (6th Cir. 1953).
16. Recently the court of appeals in Ohio held that "if there is a difference of opinion
as to guilt among the three trial judges all of whom are reasonable and experienced, this
fact not only suggests that there can be more than one conclusion as to the evidence but
proves it. This fact in and of itself injects reasonable doubt into the case . . . ." State v.
Robbins, 189 N.E.2d 641, 643 (Ohio App. 1963). Unanimity, of course, would not be re-
quired where an issue of law is decided.
17. 1 Wigmore, Evidence § 7, at 208 (3d ed. 1940). (Emphasis omitted.) See also 3
Willoughby, The Constitutional Law of the United States (2d ed. 1929). "[Sio long as the
fundamental rights of litigants to a fair trial, as regards notice, opportunity to present evi-
dence, etc., and adequate relief are provided, and special requirements of the Constitution
are not violated, Congress has a full discretion as to the form of the trial or adjudication,
and the character of the remedy to be furnished." Id. § 1130, at 1721.
18. 185 N.Y. 219, 77 N.E. 1164 (1906).
19. Id. at 229, 77 N.E. at 1167. The unsworn testimony of a child less than twelve years
old was admitted into evidence, contrary to the common-law rule. The court cited the
following cases, inter alia, in support of its position: People v. Ebelt, 180 N.Y. 470, 73
N.E. 235 (1905) (challenges of jurors); People v. Hall, 169 N.Y. 184, 62 N.E. 170 (1901)
(appointment of special jury commissioners); People v. Dunn, 157 N.Y. 528, 52 N.E. 572
(1899) (change in method of selecting of jurors); Lyon v. Manhattan Ry., 142 N.Y. 298,
37 N.E. 113 (1894) (authorizing a physical examination of plaintiff in a personal Injury
action); People v. Cannon, 139 N.Y. 32, 34 N.E. 759 (1893) (statutory prima facie evid-
ence).
20. 222 N.Y. 456, 119 N.E. 102 (1918). This case involved New York Penal Law § 442,
which provides that if a purchaser makes a written statement regarding his ability to pay
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legislative power to change rules of evidence as they existed at common law
is not restricted by the due process clause of the state constitution.2 1 Whether
this broad principle will be applied to the reasonable doubt rule depends
upon the nature of this rule. If this right is one which is protected by con-
stitution, it cannot be removed or restricted by the legislature.
With Hurtardo v. Califorda,2-' the United States Supreme Court began to
develop the theory that the application of the due process clause of the
federal constitution was not limited to rights expressed in the Bill of Rights.P
The Court affirmed this position in Twining v. New Jersey,2 4 where it said
that while not all of the rights guaranteed in the first eight amendments are
protected by due process,2 5 this does not mean that due process will be limited
to the Bill of Rights, or to those rights existing at English common law and
in the colonies at the time of the ratification of the Constitution.2 0 Thus, such
rights as that of a defendant to be acquitted unless his guilt is proven beyond
a reasonable doubt could be protected by the due process clause.
The test to be applied in determining which of these rights are protected
by due process was set forth in Palko V. Connecticut.2 7 Mr. Justice Cardozo
there used such phrases as "the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty"
and a "principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people as to be ranked as fundamental"29 to describe the criterion to be used.
the purchase price and later defaults in payment, the seller may request an examination of
the purchaser's books, and if the purchaser refuses such examination, this shall be pre-
sumptive evidence that the statement of the purchaser's ability to pay was false.
21. Id. at 461-62, 119 N.E. at 104.
22. 110 U.S. 516 (1884). Defendant was convicted in a prosecution initiated by an infor-
marion rather than by indictment of a grand jury. The Court affirmed the conviction on
the ground that the grand jury provision of the fifth amendment did not apply to the
states, since the right to an indictment by grand jury was not a fundamental right guaran-
teed by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. For a discussion of the develop-
ment of the "fundamental rights" concept in the Supreme Court, see Harding, Due Process:
A Natural Law for Criminal Prosecutions?, in Fundamental Law in Criminal Prosecutions
1 (1959).
23. "It follows that any legal proceeding enforced by public authority, . . . in furtherance
of the general public good, which regards and preserves these principles of liberty and
justice, must be held to be due process of law." 110 U.S. at 537.
24. 211 U.S. 78 (1908). The jury was instructed that it could draw an unfavorable
inference against the accused because of his failure to testify. The Court upheld the con-
viction on the grounds that protection from this type of self incrimination was not a
violation of defendant's fundamental rights and hence not protected by due process.
25. Id. at 99.
26. Id. at 101. While the Supreme Court has not used it as such, it would seem that the
ninth amendment provides a basis for holding that the Bill of Rights is not an exhaustive
listing of rights protected by the Constitution: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of
certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."
U.S. Const. amend. IX.
27. 302 US. 319 (1937).




Weighed against this test the Court held that the defendant was not protected
against double jeopardy in a state court, as he would have been in a federal
court.
30
While these early cases used a "fundamental rights" test to exclude from the
protection of due process such rights as indictment by a grand jury,8 ' freedom
from compulsory self-incrimination 2 and double jeopardy,88 other cases 4 have
held that due process requires reversal where the trial judge was financially
interested in a conviction; 35 where counsel had not been provided to an im-
poverished defendant; 6 where defendant was convicted under a statute which
insufficiently defined the illegal act ;37 where perjured testimony was knowingly
introduced by the prosecutor; 38 where the accused was denied a public trial;8D
and where evidence procured by police brutality was admitted. 40 Two recent
cases illustrating the "fundamental rights" test are Mapp v. Ohio,41 where it
was held that protection from unreasonable searches and seizures under the
fourth amendment applied to the states; and Gideon v. Wainwright,42 where
it was held unconstitutional for a state to deny counsel to an indigent de-
fendant in a noncapital case.
Apparently, only one case is directly on point as to whether the "reasonable
doubt" rule gives rise to a fundamental right protected by due process. In
State v. Robbi S,43 an Ohio court found a conviction by two of three judges
violative of defendant's fundamental right to have guilt established beyond
a reasonable doubt.44 Defendant was charged with arson, but waived his
right to a trial by jury and elected to be tried by a three-judge panel, thereby
placing himself in the same position as the defendant in the instant case.
30. 302 U.S. 319 (1937). The State of Connecticut appealed defendant's conviction for
second degree murder. The conviction was reversed and a new trial ordered at which
defendant was convicted of first degree murder. On appeal to the Supreme Court the con-
viction was affirmed.
31. Hurtardo v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
32. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908). See also Adamson v. California, 332
U.S. 46 (1947).
33. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
34. These are collected in Harding, op. cit. supra note 22, at 15-16.
35. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
36. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); see also Gideon v. Walnwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963).
37. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939).
38. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
39. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
40. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
41. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
42. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
43. 189 N.E.2d 641 (Ohio App. 1963).
44. "All members of this court agree that the presumption of innocence and the re-
quirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt require a unanimous verdict of a three-
judge court .... To hold otherwise would violate a basic and fundamental right of a
defendant." 189 N.E.2d at 644.
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A two-to-one verdict of the panel was authorized by the Ohio statute.' 5 While
concluding that a statute removing the "reasonable doubt" rule from trials
before a three-judge panel "would remove an essential ingredient of due proc-
ess of law,"' 46 the court declined to find the statute unconstitutional. Instead
it was decided that the intention of the legislature was not to repeal or modify
the "reasonable doubt" statute when it enacted the statute authorizing two-
to-one decisions.47 The result of the decision, however, did violence to the
"two-to-one decision" statute, for it restricted it to rulings on motions, pleas,
continuances, demurrers, and admissibility of evidence,48 contrary to the
clear and obvious language of the act.
Two other cases support the proposition that two-to-one decisions are un-
constitutional. In Hibdon v. United States,49 the court held that a defendant
could not waive his right to a unanimous jury verdict because "there can-
not be a verdict supported by proof beyond a reasonable doubt if one or more
jurors remain reasonably in doubt.... It would be a contradiction in terms."50
The court was "of the view that the right to a unanimous verdict cannot
under any circumstances be waived, that it is of the very essence of our
traditional concept of due process in criminal cases. . . ,,I, Thus, the court
applied the test of Palko v. Connecticut in finding that the "reasonable doubt"
rule did give rise to a fundamental right protected by due process. In Speiser
v. Randall,52 the Supreme Court stated that "due process commands that no
man shall lose his liberty unless the Government has borne the burden of
producing the evidence and convincing the factfinder of his guilt [beyond a
reasonable doubt]."53 While these two cases are not directly in point, they,
along with State v. Robbins, are indicative of a current tendency to regard
45. Ohio Rev. Code § 2945.07 (Anderson 1953), quoted in State v. Robbins, provides:
"If tried by a three-judge court, such judges, or a majority of them may decide all
questions of fact and law ... and render judgment accordingly."
46. 189 N.E.2d at 644. (Emphasis added.)
47. Ibid.
48. 189 N.E.2d at 643.
49. 204 F.2d 834 (6th Cir. 1953).
50. Id. at 838. Defendant was indicted and the case submitted to the jury. After one
half hour of deliberation, the jury was unable to agree. The court inquired whether a
majority verdict would be acceptable to the parties. The parties so agreed. The jury
voted nine to three for conviction and defendant was convicted.
51. Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
52. 357 U.S. 513 (1958). A war veteran had been denied a tax esemption because he
refused to take a loyalty oath. It was held that the requirement of a loyalty oath, since
it placed the burden of proving loyalty on the citizen, violated the requirements of due
process and also restricted the right to free speech.
53. Id. at 526 (dictum). "There is always in litigation a margin of error.... Where
one party has at stake an interest of transcending value-as a criminal defendant his
liberty-this margin of error is reduced as to him by the process of placing on the other
party the burden of producing a sufficiency of proof in the first instance, and of persuading




the "reasonable doubt" rule as giving rise to a fundamental right protected
by due process.
In determining whether this right is "fundamental," it is important to
distinguish the presumption of innocence, which places the burden of proof
upon the prosecution, from the "reasonable doubt" rule, which fixes the
quantum of proof necessary for conviction. 54 When viewed as merely requiring
a certain quantum of proof, the rule seems less substantial than when viewed
as the basis for the principal that it is better to permit ten guilty men to
escape than to punish one innocent man.r5
An additional consideration is the possibility of legislation permitting non-
unanimous jury verdicts in criminal cases.56 In Patton v. United States,"7 the
Supreme Court held that under the federal constitution trial by jury consists
of three elements: (1) that the jury be twelve men; (2) that the jury be in
the presence and under the supervision of a judge to instruct as to law, and
advise as to facts; and (3) that the verdict be unanimous. 8 From this it
may be argued that a defendant has a constitutional right to a unanimous
jury verdict independently of the reasonable doubt concept. Thus, a finding
that reasonable doubt does not give rise to a fundamental right would not
necessarily open the way for legislation permitting nonunanimous jury verdicts.
But what limits this line of reasoning to jury determinations? Can it be said
that unanimity is fundamental to a trial on the facts in all criminal cases?
No clear guidelines are available in answer to these questions, nor to the
basic question of whether the "reasonable doubt" rule gives rise to a con-
stitutional right. New York courts faced with this problem will have to make
an independent determination on the basis of analogous rights which have
been considered constitutionally protected, and upon an examination of the
nature of the right of a defendant to be acquitted unless his guilt is established
54. Thayer, op. cit. supra note 11, at 560.
55. Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 456 (1894).
56. The New York Constitution was amended in 1938 to permit verdicts by five sixth of
the jury in civil cases. N.Y. Const. art. I, § 2.
57. 281 U.S. 276 (1930). A juror became ill during the trial and could not continue to
serve. The defendant, the court and the prosecution agreed to continue before eleven jurors
who later returned a unanimous verdict for conviction. The Supreme Court upheld the
conviction on the ground that while the defendant had a constitutional right to a trial by
twelve jurors, the right could be waived. But see Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900).
The Court there held that due process does not require a verdict by twelve jurors, and
indicated that the sixth amendment does not apply to the states. Mr. Justice Harlan, In
a vigorous dissent, argued that the fourteenth amendment applies at least the first eight
amendments to the states. Id. at 605-08 (dissenting opinion).
58. Id. at 288. The Court reached this conclusion from an examination of trial by jury
in this country and in England prior to adoption of the Constitution. Unanimous verdicts
have been required in England since 1367. 1 Holdsworth, History of English Law 318
(3d ed. rewritten 1922). Contra, ALl Code of Criminal Procedure § 355 (1930); "In
capital cases no verdict may be rendered unless all the jurors concur in it. In other cases
of felony a verdict concurred in by five-sixths of the jurors, and in cases of misdemeanor
by a verdict concurred in by two-thirds of the jury may be rendered."
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beyond a reasonable doubt. The strong presumption in favor of the consti-
tutionality 9 of the statute authorizing two-to-one decisions will aid the courts
in this determination.
If the courts decide that the "reasonable doubt" rule is not guaranteed by
due process, they should have no difficulty resolving a possible conflict between
the "reasonable doubt" statute and the "two-to-one decision" statute. Such
a ruling would necessarily mean that the "reasonable doubt" rule is no more
than a rule of evidence which is subject to alteration or repeal by the legisla-
ture. The distinct possibility exists that the legislature never intended that
rule to apply to the New York City Criminal Court, since Section 41 of the
Criminal Court Act provides only that the Code of Criminal Procedure is
applicable "as far as may be, to the practice and procedure" of the Criminal
Court. As pointed out by Judge Gassman in the instant case, what is meant
by "practice and procedure" is largely undetermined in this respect.60
If this does not resolve the possible conflict, the court may resort to the
assumption that, since the legislature had knowledge of existing laws and
took cognizance of them in enacting the reasonable doubt statute, it did not
intend a conflict61 with the statute authorizing two-to-one decisions.6 - This
reasoning would be reinforced by the strong presumption against implied
repeals63 with the result that the later statute, which codified the "reasonable
doubt" rule, would be construed as not applying to the New York City Criminal
Court, thereby permitting two-to-one decisions.
If the New York courts decide that due process requires a determination of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, they should not severely limit the "two-to-
one decision" statute as did the court in State v. Robbins. Since the language
of the statute will not permit such a construction, the statute should be
found unconstitutional. This course would avoid the illogical construction
adopted by the Ohio court.
Along with the benefits of such a holding, however, a number of problems
would arise. Since Section 40 of the New York City Criminal Court Act
provides for trial before a single judge except where the defendant elects to
be tried by a three-judge panel, there is a possibility that a defendant who
does not choose the three-judge panel may be held to have waived his con-
stitutional right, although a formal instrument, similar to that for a waiver
of trial by jury,64 would probably be required before section 40 would have
this effect. Further, because of the great number of cases tried before the
59. Johnson v. City of New York, 274 N.Y. 411, 9 N.E.2d 30 (1937).
60. 40 Misc. 2d at 113, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 984.
61. In the Matter of Simmons, 130 App. Div. 350, 114 N.Y. Supp. 571 (3d Dep't),
aff'd mem., 195 N.Y. 573, 88 N.E. 1132 (1909).
62. Successive enactments of substantially the same provisions as the present N.Y.C.
Crim. Ct. Act § 42(4) date from 1787, see note 4 supra, while N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 389
was enacted in 1881.
63. People v. Dwyer, 215 N.Y. 46, 109 N.E. 103 (1915).
64. Cf. N.Y. Const. art. I, § 2: "A jury trial may be waived by the defendant ... by a
written instrument signed by the defendant in person in open court before and with the
approval of a judge or justice of a court having jurisdiction to try the offense."
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criminal court,6 5 the consequences of a possible retroactive effect of such a
holding would be of some magnitude.
While it is uncertain whether the courts will declare the statute authorizing
two-to-one decisions unconstitutional, the fact remains that this law permits
a defendant to be convicted even though a judge, experienced in evaluating
evidence, can state a reason for believing the defendant to be innocent, and
not be dissuaded from that belief by two colleagues equally practiced in such
skills. The continued possibility of unjust convictions, which the entire Code
of Criminal Procedure is designed to prevent, should be given more weight
than considerations of expediency. It is hoped that the instant case or, others
like it, will move the legislature to re-evaluate the present law. That this
practice has been followed for two centuries serves only to increase the
necessity for legislative reform.
Eminent Domain-New York Extends the "Public Use" Doctrine to the
Taking of Land for a World Trade Center.-New York and New Jersey
passed statutes' authorizing the Port of New York Authority to take over
the bankrupt Hudson tubes for the purpose of running a commuter railroad,
and to erect a "World Trade Center"'2 on a thirteen block area which now
comprises the terminal and adjacent buildings. The statutory scheme contem-
plated that the proceeds from the World Trade Center would pay for the
operation of the Hudson tubes as well as the center. Plaintiff, a corporation
doing business in one of the condemned buildings,3 brought an action for a
declaration that the New York statute was unconstitutional in that it authorized
the taking of private property for other than public use.4 On appeal from a
decision in favor of plaintiff,5 the New York Court of Appeals held that
65. It is estimated that 60,000 cases are tried each year before the New York City
Criminal Court, in which more than 1,000 defendants are convicted by two-to-one decisions.
N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1963, p. 15, col. 8.
1. N.Y. Unconsol. Laws § 6601-18 (McKinney 1961); N.J. Rev. Stat. § 32:1-35.50-68
(1963).
2. The World Trade Center is to be a complex of buildings that will be leased to private
companies engaged in activities related to world trade.
3. This case involved two actions: one by the Port of New York Authority to condemn
the Hudson tubes and adjacent buildings, and one by the plaintiff seeking an injunction
and a declaratory judgment that the statute authorizing the Authority to condemn the
land was unconstitutional.
4. It was also contended that the legislatures of New York and New Jersey could not
grant the Port Authority the power to undertake this project without congressional approval,
since when Congress originally approved the Authority, there was no contemplated purpose
of building a World Trade Center. Finally, it was alleged that the statute was unconstitu-
tional in that it did not take into account the good will of a business in the valuation
of the property taken.
5. Courtesy Sandwich Shop, Inc. v. Port of New York Authority, 17 App. Div. 2d 590,
237 N.Y.S.2d 820 (1st Dep't), reversing In the Matter of the Port Authority Trans-
Hudson Corp., 38 Misc. 2d 412, 239 N.Y.S.2d 782 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
[Vol. 32
CASE NOTES
the operation of a World Trade Center is a public use,6 and therefore the
statute authorizing the Port Authority to condemn land for this purpose is
constitutional, 7 even though its facilities were to be leased to private individu-
als.8 Courtesy Sandwich Shop, Inc. v. Port of New York Authority, 12 N.Y.2d
379, 190 N.E.2d 402, 240 N.Y.S.2d 1, appeal denied, - U.S. - (1963).
Early American cases allowed condemnation for such clearly public uses
as the construction of parks,9 schools,10 and roads;" and in New York it was
held that the establishment of a public market 2 and the creation of a uniform
wharf system'3 were public uses. Thus the traditional view of "public use" in
6. Until recently it had been held in New York, as elsewhere, that whether condemna-
tion of property is or is not for a public use is a judicial question. Fifth Ave. Coach Lines,
Inc. v. City of New York, 11 N.Y.2d 342, 183 N.E.2d 684, 229 N.Y.S.2d 400 (1962);
Pocantico Water Works Co. v. Bird, 130 N.Y. 249, 29 N.E. 246 (1891). See Jahr,
Eminent Domain § 9 (1953). One of the recent cases in New York holding that there was
a justiciable issue regarding the alleged public use for which the private property was taken
is Denihan Enterprises, Inc. v. O'Dwyer, 302 N.Y. 451, 99 N.E.2d 235 (1951). There New
York City, pursuant to a statute, had made a contract with an insurance company under
which the city would condemn certain land and then lease it at public auction for fifty
years for the purpose of having the lessee build a public parking garage. Plaintiff sued,
alleging that the garage was intended primarily for the use of the occupants of the apart-
ment house also to be erected by the insurance company, contending that this would really
benefit the private insurance company, rather than the public. The court said that the
proposed use would not be public if the public benefit were only incidental to a private
benefit, and not for the purpose authorized by the statute. Id. at 458, 99 N.E.2d at 238.
On the other hand, recent cases raise serious doubt as to whether or not the courts have
really followed the principle that whether condemnation of property is or is not a public
use is a judicial question. These cases held that the taking was for a public use merely be-
cause of the legislative determination to that effect in the statute. In the Matter of Public
Service Comm., 217 N.Y. 61, 111 N.E. 658 (1916); Brent v. Hoch, 25 Misc. 2d 1063, 205
N.Y.S.2d 68 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Saso v. New York, 20 Misc. 2d 826, 194 N.Y.S.2d 789 (Sup.
Ct. 1959).
7. Under the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution, a state may not take
private property for other than a public use without the owner's consent. Missouri Pac. Ry.
v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 (1896). N.Y. Const. art. I, § 7(a) has been similarly interpreted.
Hopper v. Britt, 203 N.Y. 144, 149, 96 N.E. 371, 372 (1911) (dictum); In re Split Rock
Cable-Road Co., 128 N.Y. 408, 28 N.E. 506 (1891); In the Matter of Albany Street, 11
Wend. 149 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1834).
8. The court also held that no congressional approval was necessary for the project once
enabling legislation was passed by New York and New Jersey. 12 N.Y.2d at 391, 190 N.E.2d
at 406, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 7. Finally, the court held that it is settled in New York that good
will of a business is not taken into account in the valuation of the property taken under
condemnation proceedings. Id. at 391, 190 N.E.2d at 406, 240 N.Y.S.2d at S.
9. Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282 (1893); People v. Adirondack Ry. Co., 160
N.Y. 225, 54 N.E. 689 (1899), aff'd sub. nom. Adirondack Ry. Co. v. New York, 176
U.S. 335 (1900).
10. Commissioners of D.C. v. Shannon & Luchs Constr. Co., 17 F.2d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1927).
11. Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700 (1923).
12. Ketchum v. City of Buffalo, 14 N.Y. 356 (1856).
13. In the Matter of the Mayor of the City of New York, 135 N.Y. 253, 31 N.E. 1043
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New York required: (1) that the public have direct access to the constructed
facilities; (2) that the public derive direct benefit from such facilities; and
(3) that the government control the use to which the property was to be put.' 4
In taking property for slum clearance, however, these criteria were abandoned.
Obviously the construction of new housing facilities could not provide direct
access to the general public; it would accrue to the benefit of the public only
indirectly; and the government would not always have direct control over the
property.'5 In New York City Housing Authority v. Muller,'0 the first New
York use of condemnation for slum clearance purposes, the court held that where
there existed unsanitary and substandard housing conditions constituting a
menace to the health, safety and morals of the public, eminent domain could
not be resisted. The replacement of such buildings by sanitary housing accommo-
dations for persons of low income was a public benefit and constituted a public
use of the land. Thus the court reasoned that the fact that improved low in-
come public housing was in the public interest was sufficient to constitute a
public use.' 7
This concept was later expanded to include condemnation of land in a
slum area which was to be resold to a private developer for the erection of
private housing.'8 The theory was that the eradication of the slum coupled
with the safe and sanitary housing to be built on the site constituted a public
use.
In Kaskel v. Impellitteri,'9 however, slum clearance alone was considered the
vital factor in determining whether land had been taken for a public use. There
the later use to which the land was to be put 20 would only be of incidental benefit
to the public, since it was to be run by private individuals for their own profit.
(1892). In this case the city was allowed to condemn private land to build the wharves even
though they might later be used by private individuals under long-term leases from the
city. See text accompanying note 8 supra.
14. See generally Jahr, op. cit. supra note 6, §§ 6, 7 (1953).
15. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
16. 270 N.Y. 333, 1 N.E.2d 153 (1936).
17. Id. at 342, 1 N.E.2d at 155. The New York Constitution was subsequently amended
specifically to provide that condemnation of slums for the purpose of building improved
public housing constitutes a public use. N.Y. Const. art. XVIII, § 1.
Other states have reached the same result by another, and interesting, route: A state
has the right, under its police power, to do anything necessary for the protection of public
health, safety or morals. Because of the difficulty in finding a public use in the condemnation
of land for slum clearance (see text accompanying note 15 supra), they instead found the
area dangerous to the health, safety or morals of the public, thus justifying the taking
as a confiscation under the police power. See Schneider v. District of Columbia, 117 F. Supp.
705 (D.D.C. 1953), and Randolph v. Wilmington Housing Authority, 139 A.2d 476 (Del.
1958). The reasoning developed that if a state could confiscate "delinquent" housing under
its police power without giving the owner compensation therefor, it had the power, a
fortiori, to do the same thing with the owner receiving just compensation, i.e., to take
the land under eminent domain.
18. Murray v. LaGuardia, 291 N.Y. 320, 52 N.E.2d 884 (1943).
19. 306 N.Y. 73, 115 N.E.2d 659 (1953).
20. The land was to be used as the site for the New York Coliseum.
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Thus the elimination of the slum by the developer, rather than the future
use of the land, constituted the public use. 21
The later use of the land still remained, however, a sufficient justification
for condemnation. In Cannata v. City of New York,2 for example, the land
involved was for the most part undeveloped, but did contain homes that were
anything but slums. The city had decided that this area would be ideal for an
industrial park 3 The court held that:
an area does not have to be a "slum" to make its redevelopment a public use....
The condemnation by the city of an area such as this so that it may be turned into
sites for needed industries is a public use. ... 24
This sweeping view of what constitutes a public use was foreshadowed in
Berman v. Parker- 5 decided three years earlier by the United States Supreme
Court. There Mr. Justice Douglas said:
To take for the purpose of ridding the area of slums is one thing; it is quite another
.... [plaintiff's] argument goes, to take a man's property merely to develop a
better balanced, more attractive community . . . . But the means of executing the
project are for Congress . . . to determine, once the public purpose has been estab-
lished .... We cannot say that public ownership is the sole method of promoting
the public purposes of community redevelopment projects.20
Thus, once a public use is found to exist, the exercise of eminent domain is
proper even though the land is turned over to private enterprise.
The Cannata case, then, stands for the proposition that when there exists even
an incidental or indirect benefit to the public from the proposed undertaking,
so that it can be termed a public use, condemnation will be allowed even though
the development be left to, and ownership vest in, private parties.
In the instant case the court held that condemnation of land for a World
Trade Center constituted a taking for a public use, since
any use of the property sought to be condemned that is functionally related to the
centralizing of all port business is unobjectionable even though private persons are to
be the immediate lessees. 27
Judge Van Voorhis, in dissent, cited the impossibility of attaining the goal
of a true World Trade Center by concentrating the multifarious activities
21. It should be noted that the main controversy in Kaskel was whether or not the sub-
ject land actually constituted a slum area. 306 N.Y. at 79-80, 115 N.E.2d at 661-62.
22. 11 N.Y.2d 210, 182 N.E.2d 395, 227 N.Y.S.2d 903 (1962).
23. The "industrial park" to be erected was a privately built project that would house a
complex of private industrial businesses. Compare this with the project involved in the
instant case.
24. 11 N.Y.2d at 215, 182 N.E.2d at 397, 227 N.Y.S.2d at 905-06.
25. 348 US. 26 (1954).
26. Id. at 31-34.
27. 12 N.Y.2d at 388, 190 N.E.2d at 404, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 5. The court continued: "It
is the gathering together of all business relating to world trade that is supposed to be
the great convenience held out to those who use American ports and which is supposed to
attract trade with a resultant stimulus to the economic well-being of the Port of New
York." Id. at 388, 190 N.E.2d at 404-05, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 5.
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necessary for this end in a small area. Further, even if this were possible, he
could not see the logic in finding a public purpose merely because a network
of commercial activities is to be centralized "in some nebulous manner in the
13 blocks on the west side of lower Manhattan .... ,,28 He pointed out what
he considered the real reason behind the project-a device to gain operating
revenue for the Hudson tubes, and to put the Port Authority in the real estate
business.29
There have been only a few modern opinions which have refused to depart
from the traditional concept of public use.30 In these cases an attempt was made
to strike a balance between the taking of land actually needed for public pur-
poses and the rights of a private citizen to use his land in the manner he sees
fit. Thus, in Hogue v. Port of Seattle,31 a statute had been passed which de-
clared certain land in the city of Seattle to be "marginal land"3 2 and which
authorized its taking by the Port of Seattle33 to build sites for industrial
companies. The court said that while the development might constitute an
economic benefit to the whole community, the project was not a public use,
but the transferring of land from one private owner to another, who, in the
city's judgment, would use the land to better advantage.3 4 The court held that
the government could not take private land under the aegis of eminent domain
for a project which, in its opinion, would result merely in a better utilization
of the property.35
The fifth amendment's requirement that eminent domain be exercised only
where a public use is found reflects the fundamental precept that a person may
use his property as he sees fit and that he may not be deprived of it involuntarily
for the use of another private individual. On the other hand, the expansion,
through the years, of the definition of public use has diminished the constitu-
tional protection. It is true that in today's society most industrial or commercial
enterprises which are conducted for the direct benefit of private persons result
in an incidental benefit to the public. The problem facing the courts, then, is
to determine what degree of public benefit is necessary to constitute a public
28. Id. at 394, 190 N.E.2d at 408, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 10. Continuing: "It is Incredible
that, under a free enterprise system, the 'centralization' of these multifarious activities
could transform the housing of them from private to public purposes within the application
of the law of eminent domain." Id. at 396, 190 N.E.2d at 409, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 11.
29. Id. at 396, 190 N.E.2d at 409, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 12.
30. See, e.g., Hogue v. Port of Seattle, 54 Wash. 2d 799, 341 P.2d 171 (1959) (en bane);
Opinion of Justices, 152 Me. 440, 131 A.2d 904 (1957) ; In re Opinion of Justices, 332 Mass.
769, 126 N.E.2d 795 (1955); Opinion to Governor, 76 R.I. 365, 70 A.2d 817 (1950).
31. Supra note 30.
32. There were ten statutory definitions of what constituted marginal land. Wash. Rev.
Code Ann. § 53.25.030 (1962). The idea, in general, was that land not used to its best
advantage comes under this heading.
33. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 53.25.040, .100 (1962). The Port of Seattle is a govern-
mental organization similar to the Port of New York Authority.
34. 54 Wash. 2d at 838, 341 P.2d at 193.
35. Ibid. This view is likely to remain a minority view in the light of the Supreme Court's
decision in Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
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use. It may well be that New York has gone too far in enlarging the concept
of "public use." Several courts in other jurisdictions, while including slum
clearance under public use, have stopped short of the holding in Cannata, ex-
pressly stating that mere economic benefit or desirability is not the basis for the
exercise of eminent domain.3 6
An example of the radical changes the New York courts have written into
the concept of public use in the span of a few years may be seen through a
comparison of the Kaske 37 case with the present decision. Kaskcl involved the
condemnation of land for construction of the New York Coliseum; the instant
case involved the taking of land for the construction of a World Trade Center.
In both cases the projects were to be operated by private persons for their
own benefit and an incidental benefit would accrue to the public. In the
present case, in which a public use was found, the benefit was the centraliza-
tion of diverse commercial activities and the economic returns to be derived
therefrom, while in Kaskel, the Coliseum was conceived as a benefit for the
community as a tourist attraction or a permanent cultural center, with its en-
suing economic returns. The main controversy in Kaskel, however, was whether
the land to be taken actually constituted a slum.38 It stands to reason that if
the court had considered the construction of the Coliseum to be a public use,
it would never have reached this problem, since eminent domain would have
been proper regardless of the condition of the land before condemnation.
The most telling criticism of the extension of the public use doctrine beyond
the field of slum clearance was Judge Van Voorhis' strong dissent in Cannata.
In arguing that the court had gone too far, he warned of the probable effect
of its decision on future cases:
Conceding that the power of eminent domain has been extended to the elimination
of areas that are actually slum, the question here is whether this power can be
further extended to the condemnation of factories, stores, private dwellings or
vacant land which are properly maintained and are neither substandard nor unsanitary,
so that their owners may be deprived of them against their will to be resold to
a selected group of private developers whose projects are believed by the municipal
administration to be more in harmony with the times 3 9
This prophecy has been fulfilled in the present case.
It may be true that changing needs dictate changing rules, but there comes
a point where the right of private property cannot survive along with a broaden-
ing concept of public use. This point may have been reached in the law of
eminent domain.40 It is now incumbent upon the courts either to place a limit
on the expansion of public use or to redefine the concept of private property to
conform with the proper exercise of eminent domain in accordance with the
needs of a modern society.
36. See authorities cited note 30 supra.
37. 306 N.Y. 73, 115 N.E.2d 659 (1953).
38. See note 21 supra.
39. 11 N.Y.2d at 217, 182 N.E2d at 398, 227 N.Y.S.2d at 908.
40. See Jahr, op. cit. supra note 6, § 6.
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Labor Law-Captive Audience Speech Prior to a Representative Election
Held Not a Per Se Unfair Labor Practice.-In 1959, the American Retail
Federation and Local 880 of the Retail Stores Employees, AFL-CIO, began
efforts to organize employees in two branches of the May Department Stores.
Throughout the campaign the employer enforced a broad no-solicitation rule.'
Prior to a 1960 representation election, company representatives addressed em-
ployees several times during working hours on company property. Subsequently
the union demanded equal opportunity to speak to the employees. The company
denied the union's request and the union alleged an unfair labor practice. The
National Labor Relations Board, relying on the decision in Bonwit Teller, Inc.
v. NLRB,2 held that the employer's actions constituted an unfair labor practice.8
On appeal, the court of appeals set aside and denied enforcement of the
Board's order. A unanimous court held that an employer who made a non-
coercive anti-union speech to a "captive audience," while continuing to enforce
a broad no-solicitation rule, did not commit an unfair labor practice in refusing
the union equal opportunity under similar conditions, unless it was shown that
there were not sufficient alternate means of contact open to the union. May Dep't
Stores Co. v. NLRB, 316 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1963).
The origin of the no-solicitation rule was the employer's need to eliminate
distraction and insure efficient operation of his business. The application of
such a rule outside of working hours had been confined to industries where
special circumstances necessitated such a broad rule. Decisions of the NLRB
have subsequently limited the broad rule to department stores. This was made
clear in May Dep't Stores,4 where the company was permitted to have a no-
solicitation rule enforced during working hours, and even during nonworking
hours on the selling floor. Although the rule is not directed solely against
union solicitation, this is the area of its greatest application. It is not always
condoned by the courts, and may, under certain circumstances, be itself an
unfair labor practice.5 The rule must be uniformly applied and its relaxation
in favor of any faction without equal opportunity given to competing groups
has been held an unfair labor practice.0
1. The rule forbade "non-employees to solicit for any purpose on the company's
property. It also prohibited solicitation by employees during the working time of either the
employee soliciting or the employee being solicited. Further, the rule prohibited solicitation
by any employee during store opening hours on any portion of the company's premises
normally visited by the public or where noise or talking was not allowed." May Dep't
Stores Co. v. NLRB, 316 F.2d 797, 798 (6th Cir. 1963).
2. 197 F.2d 640, 645 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 905 (1953), holding that an
employer enforcing a broad no-solicitation rule and making anti-union speeches, prior to
an election, on company time and property was guilty of an unfair labor practice If he did
not allow the union equal opportunity to do so.
3. May Dep't Stores Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 797 (1962).
4. 59 N.L.R.B. 976 (1944) and cases cited therein.
5. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 803 (1945); NLRB v. Babcock &
Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 113 (1956) (dictum).
6. In NLRB v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 309 U.S. 206 (1940), where the company permitted
one union to go aboard ship to solicit employees but refused passes to another union, the
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The application of the "equal opportunity" concept to "captive audience"
speeches given by an employer was first suggested in NLRB v. Clark Bros.,
in dictum.7 In that case, the Board found that it was an unfair labor practice for
an employer to make even a noncoercive speech to employees who were a
"captive audience." 8 This decision was repudiated by Congress in the new
(1947) Section 8(c) of the Labor Management Relations Act.0 But in Bonwit
Teller, Inc. v. NLRB the court of appeals again disapproved a "captive audi-
ence" speech as being an unfair labor practice, by holding that the "equal oppor-
tunity" concept would apply where a company also enforced a broad no-
solicitation rule.10 There, the employer made a noncoercive anti-union speech
to a "captive audience" prior to a union election. The court gave a broad inter-
pretation to Sections 7 and 8(a) (1) of the Labor Management Relations Act,"'
and concluded that the company
was ... required to abstain from campaigning against the Union on the same
premises to which the Union was denied access; if it should be otherwise, the practi-
cal advantage to the employer who was opposed to unionization would constitute a
serious interference with the right of his employees to organize.'-
Thus, the court enforced the rule enunciated by the NLRB. The Board held
that an employer delivering a "captive audience" speech to his employees
must give the union the opportunity to reply under substantially equal condi-
tions.' 3 Chief Judge Swan's dissent in the appellate decision, however, fore-
shadowed later decisions on this question. He contended that the majority's
Court stated that "a fair election required that equal opportunities be given to both.... "
Id. at 226. In NLRB v. American Furnace Co., 158 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1946), the court
held an employer guilty of an unfair labor practice for granting permission to an anti-union
group to distribute literature without giving an equal opportunity to the union. See NLRB
v. Stowe Spinning Co., 336 U.S. 226 (1949), where the Supreme Court held that a denial of
equal opportunity to the union of use of a company town's only available meeting hall vras
an unfair labor practice.
7. 163 F.2d 373, 376 (2d Cir. 1947) (dictum).
8. Clark Bros., 70 N.L.R.B. 802 (1946). A "captive audience" speech is one made
to an assembly of employees on company time.
9. "The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof,
whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of
an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this Act, if such expression con-
tains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit." 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(c) (1958). See S & S Corrugated Paper Mfach. Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 1363 (1950).
10. 197 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 905 (1953).
11. Section 7 provides: "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection . . . ." 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157
(1958). Section 8(a)(1) provides: "(a) It shall be unfair labor practice for an employer-
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
section 7 . . . ." 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U..C. § 158(a) (1) (1958).
12. Bonwit Teller, Inc. v. NLRB, 197 F.2d at 645.
13. Bonwit Teller, Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 608, 612 (1951).
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decision was contrary to the obvious intent of Congress,14 in that the employer's
privilege of "arguing against unionization without any limitation, except that
the expression of his views must contain 'no threat of reprisal or force or
promise of benefit,' "15 was being abridged. In the following year, the Board
applied the Bonwit Teller rule in American Tube Bending Co.10 This, however,
was the last of the cases in the Bonwit Teller mold, for a newly constituted
Board announced the first of a series of decisions 17 that served to weaken and
destroy the Bonwit Teller rationale. In Livingston Shirt Corp.,'8 the Board
stated:
In the original Bonwit Teller case, the Board . . . found that a "fundamental con-
sideration" in support of its decision was the right of employees under Section 7 to
"hear both sides under circumstances which approximate equality." We have no quarrel
with this principle, but we think that it is to be achieved not by administratively
grafting new limbs on the statute, but by a strict enforcement of those provisions of
the statute which afford employers the right of free uncoercive speech and grants
[sic] employees the protected right to join labor unions free from coercion or dis-
crimination.19
The Board contended that support for the Bonwit Teller rule could be found
neither in the language of the Labor Management Relations Act nor in the
intent of Congress, 20 and held that it is not an unfair labor practice for the em-
ployer to make a noncoercive, anti-union speech to a "captive audience,"
provided that he is not enforcing a broad no-solicitation rule.21
14. "[Tlhis section (section 8(c)] provides that if, under all the circumstances there Is
neither an expressed nor implied threat of reprisal, force, or offer of benefit, the Board
shall not predicate any finding of unfair labor practice." S. Rep. No. 105, 81st Cong., 1st
Sess. 24 (1947). The House of Representatives concurred: "This [section 8(c)J guarantees
free speech to employers, to employees, and to unions. Although the Labor Board says It
does not limit free speech, the decisions show that it uses against people what the Constitu-
tion says they can use freely. . . The bill corrects this, providing that nothing anyone
says shall constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice unless it, by its own express
terms, threatens force or economic reprisal. This means that a statement may not be used
against the person making it unless it, standing alone, is unfair within the express terms
of Section (7) and (8) of the Amended Act." H.R. Rep. No. 245, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 32
(1947).
15. Bonwit Teller, Inc. v. NLRB, 197 F.2d at 646 (dissenting opinion).
16. 102 N.L.R.B. 735 (1953), enforced, 205. F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1953).
17. Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 400 (1953); Nutone, Inc., 112 N.L.R.B. 1153
(1955); Avondale Mills, 115 N.L.R.B. 840 (1956); May Dep't Stores Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 797
(1962).
18. 107 N.L.R.B. 400 (1953).
19. Id. at 406.
20. "The majority in Bonwit Teller did not cite, nor have we been able to find, any sup-
port in the statutory language or legislative history for holding that the employer who
exercises his own admitted rights under the statute thereby incurs an affirmative obligation
to donate his premises and working time to the union for the purpose of propagandizing
the employees." Ibid.
21. Id. at 409.
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In NLRB v. F. W. Woolworth Co.,2 2 the court was faced with an attempt
by the Board to apply the Bonwit Teller rationale to a factual situation sim-
ilar to Bonwit Teller and the instant case.23 The court made it clear that Sec-
tion 8(c) of the Labor Management Relations Act applied to cases of this
type. Basing its decision on Chief Judge Swan's dissent in Bonwit Teller, Inc. v.
NLRB,24 the court stated that the rights granted the employer by section 8(c)
insure his ability to speak to his employees on his own time without committing
an unfair labor practice. The court concluded that the exercise of this right
will not be declared a discriminatory application of a no-solicitation rule.e2
Subsequent decisions established new guidelines to fill the void left by the
faltering Bonwit Teller rule. Several emphasized that the total picture was to
be considered in no-solicitation rule cases.2 6 Only if the no-solicitation rule,
when coupled with all the other circumstances of the case, results in the
destruction of all effective avenues of approach to the employee, is the employer
guilty of an unfair labor practice.
In NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.27 the Supreme Court overruled the Board28
and enunciated a guide for no-solicitation rules in general. There, the union was
forbidden to distribute handbills on company property, although the company
disseminated literature of its own. The Court stated that "an employer may
validly post his property against nonemployee distribution of union literature
if reasonable efforts by the union through other available channels of commu-
nication will enable it to reach the employees. .. ,*9 It went on to declare that
if circumstances do exist that make contact by other means ineffective, the
employer must then allow the union to use the means otherwise prohibited to
it. In the absence of such conditions there is no unfair labor practice.
Shortly thereafter, faced with a similar factual situation, the Supreme Court
in NLRB v. United Steelworkers3 0 made it clear that the Bonwit Teller rule
no longer applied. Citing the dissent in that case, it said:
Of course the rules had the effect of closing off one channel of communication; but
22. 214 F.2d 78 (6th Cir. 1954).
23. F. W. Woolworth Co., 102 N.L.R.B. 581 (1953).
24. 197 F.2d at 646.
25. "The dissenting opinion of Chief Justice [sic] Swan in the Bonwit Teller casle is
the correct holding, that Section 8(c) has direct and controlling application and that a no-
solicitation rule cannot cut down the rights given the employer under Section 8(c). In
light of the sweeping statutory provision and the legislative history a no-solicitation rule
cannot prevent an employer from conferring with his own employees on his own premises
and on his own time and the rule is not discriminatorily applied because of the employer's
refusal to permit the union to campaign on its premises when there are adequate facilities for
access to the employees." 214 F.2d at 81.
26. See NTLRB v. United Steelworkers, 357 U.S. 357, 363-64 (1958); NLRB v. Babcock
& Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956); NLRB v. Seamprufe, Inc., 222 F.2d 858 (10th Cir.
1955), aff'd, 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
27. Supra note 26.
28. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 485 (1954).
29. 351 U.S. at 112.
30. 357 US. 357 (1958).
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the Taft-Hartley Act does not command that labor organizations as a matter of
abstract law, under all circumstances, be protected in the use of every possible means
of reaching the minds of individual workers, nor that they are entitled to use a medium
of communication simply because the employer is using it. . . .The Board ...may
find relevant alternative channels available for communications on the right to organ-
ize. When this important issue is not even raised before the Board and no evidence
bearing on it is adduced, the concrete basis for appraising the significance of the
employer's conduct is wanting. 3'
In the instant case, the Board, in an attempt to revive the Bonwit Teller
rule, stated that to allow the employer to make a "captive audience" speech
without allowing the union equal opportunity to speak would result in a
"glaring 'imbalance in opportunities for organizational communication.' "82 As
in Bonwit Teller, the Board felt that "equal opportunity" required that the
union be allowed to make a speech under the same conditions. Nothing less was
considered suitable.
The court of appeals rebutted the Board's argument. It stated that there
was no showing that other effective means of contact or communication with
the employees were unavailable.83 The court concluded that the fact "that a
speech during working time on company premises may be preferable to use of
contacts away from the work-site cannot in and of itself render the employer's
conduct unfair under the Act.
' 3 4
Thus, the court of appeals thwarted an attempt to revive a rule inconsistent
with legislative intent and recent decisions. The effect of its decision was to
eliminate the proviso in Livingston Shirt that the employer not be enforcing
a broad no-solicitation rule,85 and to require that the Board pay more heed to
the ruling of the Supreme Court in United Steelworkers. Thus, the instant
case, coupled with those preceding it, clearly indicates that it is permissible
to make a "captive audience" speech while enforcing a broad no-solicitation
rule, providing the total picture does not reflect a substantial imbalance in
opportunities for organizational communication.
Standing to Sue-Taxpayers' Suits-Taxpayer's Right to Challenge Con-
stitutionality of State Expenditure Denied.-Plaintiff, a citizen and tax-
payer of New York State, placed small wagers' at various race tracks through-
out the State. He later brought an action for a declaration that Section 45-a
31. Id. at 363-64.
32. May Dep't Stores Co., 136 NL.R.B. at 801.
33. "There (were] . . .no findings of non-accessibilities by the Board in this case.
There is no showing that the employees, away from their employer's premises, are removed
or isolated from normal, usual communications. Indeed, there appears from the record every
indication that they were accessible through alternative channels." May Dep't Stores Co. v.
NLRB, 316 F.2d 797, 801 (6th Cir. 1963).
34. Id. at 800-01.
35. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
1. Plaintiff wagered a total of $18 at the defendant race tracks.
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of the Pari-Mutuel Revenue Law,2 which provides for reimbursement to all
race tracks which intend to make capital improvements,3 is unconstitutional. 4
The supreme court, special term, entered judgment dismissing the complaint
on the ground that plaintiff lacked standing to sue, which was affirmed by the
appellate division.5 On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed and
held that since plaintiff was an unaggrieved citizen-taxpayer he lacked standing
to challenge the constitutionality of the statute. St. Clair v. Yonkers Raceway,
Inc., 13 N.Y.2d 72, 192 N.E.2d 15, 242 N.Y.S.2d 43 (1963).
Throughout the United States "at least 34 states clearly sanction taxpayers'
suits at the state level... [while] two states-New York and New Mexico-
squarely prohibit such actions."6 At the present time, the Supreme Court of the
United States follows the minority rule.7
The doctrine of "standing to sue" has played an important role in the field
of constitutional law. Where a court finds that a plaintiff lacks standing, it will
usually refuse to decide the case on its merits. In determining whether a plain-
tiff has standing, most courts will attempt to discover whether a "peculiar
interest" of the plaintiff is involved, which includes either a pecuniary loss8
or a violation of an individual legal right.9
It is important to note that the two states which refuse to allow a taxpayer
to maintain an action against a state official or to challenge a state expenditure
do permit a taxpayer to bring an action against a municipal official and to contest
the validity of a municipal expenditure. This has been justified by the courts of
New Mexico by means of an analogy to a private corporation. The theory is
that since a shareholder in a private corporation may bring a derivative action
to recover for the wrongful acts of its officers, then for the same reason a
taxpayer should have the right to maintain a suit to challenge the wrongful
expenditure of municipal funds.10
2. N.Y. Unconsol. Laws § 8020 (McKinney 1961).
3. Certain requirements had to be met before there could be reimbursement. N.Y.
Unconsol. Laws § 8020 (10) (McKinney 1961). The money used for reimbursement came
from funds that had previously gone to the State as taxes.
4. The contention was that the statute, as enacted, violated N.Y. Const. art. VII, § 8,
which prohibits the expenditure of public funds to private parties. Plaintiff sought to have
the race tracks pay to the State the full amount of taxes the State would have received
had the statute never been passed.
5. St. Clair v. Yonkers Raceway, Inc., 17 App. Div. 2d 899 (4th Dep't 1962) (memo-
randum decision).
6. St. Clair v. Yonkers Raceway, Inc., 13 N.Y.2d at 78, 192 N.E.2d at 17, 242 N.YS.2d
at 46 (dissenting opinion).
7. Id. at 76, 192 N.E.2d at 15, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 44. See Frothingham v. Mellon, 262
U.S. 447 (1923).
8. See, e.g., Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952).
9. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955). This factor also includes
the element of coercion, i.e., the plaintiff may have been compelled to do something against
his volition. See, e.g., Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
10. Shipley v. Smith, 45 N.I. 23, 107 P.2d 1050 (1940) (taxpayer's action against a
county board to enjoin payment of public moneys of the county under an illegal contract).
See generally 4 Dillon, Municipal Corporations §§ 574-80 (5th ed. 1911). The question of
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In New York a taxpayer derives authority to maintain a suit against a muni-
aipal officer or to challenge a municipal expenditure from a specific statute."
The statute has been construed, however, to exclude actions against state
officials or actions to challenge state expenditures. 12
The prohibition against taxpayers' suits in New York dates back to the
mid-nineteenth century, to the case of Doolittle v. Supervisors of Broome
County,'3 and the rationale of that decision prevails today. In Doolittle, plain-
tiffs were freeholders who sought a judgment to avoid an act of the county
board of supervisors which had the effect of dividing their town into three
separate towns. They complained that the political division had been directed
contrary to state law. The court dismissed, reasoning that where a public wrong
is alleged the remedy should be sought by prosecution initiated by the state, and
that relief cannot be given to individuals who have not suffered personal
injury.14 One of the arguments advanced by Doolittle was that if it granted
relief to these petitioners, the floodgates of litigation would be opened at the
whim of individual taxpayers, regardless of the bona fides of their complaints.
The court also characterized the issue as a political question.
The New York rule on standing to sue was still more clearly expressed in
Schieffelin v. Komfort,15 where the plaintiff, a citizen and taxpayer of New
York City, sought to enjoin state election officials from taking steps preliminary
to the nomination and election of delegates to a constitutional convention. The
court held that the plaintiff lacked the requisite standing since he had not
alleged the violation of any rights personal to him, as distinguished from rights
held in common with all other state citizens.' The implication from both the
whether New Mexico would allow a state taxpayer to contest the validity of a state statute
was decided in 1926 in Asplund v. Hannett, 31 N.M. 641, 249 Pac. 1074 (1926), where the
court held that the citizen-taxpayer lacked standing to maintain his action. "'It Is not
the duty of this or any other court to sit in judgment upon the action of the legislative
branch of the government, except when the question is presented by a litigant claiming to be
adversely affected by the legislative act on the particular ground complained of.'" Id. at
650, 249 Pac. at 1077. "'[P]aintiff must show that he has a special interest, In respect
to which he will suffer special injury.'" Id. at 656, 249 Pac. at 1079.
11. N.Y. Munic. Law § 51.
12. Olmsted v. Meahl, 219 N.Y. 270, 114 N.E. 393 (1916).
13. 18 N.Y. 155 (1858).
14. "[W]here there is no direct individual injury, no action can be maintained by a
citizen on the ground that his interests as a member of the state have been interfered with
or disturbed .... " Id. at 159. "Every person may legally question the constitutional validity
of an act of the legislature which affects his private rights; but if a citizen may maintain
an action for such a purpose in respect to his rights as a voter and tax-payer, the courts
may regularly be called upon to revise all laws which may be passed." Id. at 162. "[Tlhe
fiscal business of the state would come to be transacted mainly in the courts." Id. at 163.
15. 212 N.Y. 520, 106 N.E. 675 (1914).
16. "There is no ... statute expressly permitting an individual taxpayer to sustain an
action to test the constitutionality of an act of the legislature without showing that his
civil or property rights are specially and particularly affected and in which he demands and
is entitled to relief based upon his rights. The fact that the Constitution makes express
provision for a review by the Supreme Court of an act of the legislature apportioning the
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Doolittle and Schieffelin cases is that the courts will not decide "political
questions." The reasoning of Schieffelin was applied by the appellate division
in Bull v. Stictnman,17 where the plaintiff, a citizen and taxpayer, sought a de-
claratory judgment that a $128,000 state grant to Canisius College was an
unconstitutional "establishment of religion." The court of appeals,1 8 in a
memorandum decision, rejected the plaintiff's argument that the necessity for
a "special or peculiar interest" should be discarded in cases where the issue
was one of great public importance and all interested parties were before the
court.' Heim v. McCall,- ° however, might be taken as a silent relaxation of the
requirements of standing in taxpayers' suits. From the facts of the case it ap-
peared that the plaintiff lacked standing, but nonetheless the appellate division
decided the case on the merits without reference to the plaintiff's standing,21 and
the court of appeals followed suit although it reversed on the merits.- The case
state into districts, at the suit of any citizen, and refrains from providing for such a review
in other cases, is of itself evidence that it was not the intention of the people by the Consti-
tution to confer upon the judicial branch of government general authority at the suit of a
citizen as such to sit in review of the acts of other branches of government." Id. at 529,
106 N.E. at 677. "The rights to be affected must be personal as distinguished from the
rights in common with the great body of people. . . . Jurisdiction, being the power to
hear and determine, is not given to the courts as guardians of the rights of the people
generally against illegal acts of the executive or legislative branches of government." Id. at
530, 106 N.E. at 677-78.
17. 273 App. Div. 311, 78 N.Y.S.2d 279 (3d Dep't 1948). "'The clear weight of authority
in this state is against the alleged power and authority of the courts to pass upon the
constitutionality of a statute except in an action or proceeding in behalf of a person whose
special, peculiar personal rights are affected thereby.'" Id. at 313, 78 N.YS.2d at 281.
18. Bull v. Stichman, 298 N.Y. 516, 80 N.E.2d 661 (1948) (memorandum decision),
affirming 273 App. Div. 311, 78 N.Y.S.2d 279 (3d Dep't).
19. The plaintiff relied on Kuhn v. Curran, 294 N.Y. 207, 61 N.E.2d 513 (1945). There
a taxpayer brought proceedings for orders in the nature of mandamus directing, in effect,
that state officers act as if certain acts of the legislature had never been passed. The act
would have altered the judicial districts of the State. The court ignored the standing issue
and stated that "in view of the importance to the public of an authoritative determination
of that question at the present time, we do not pause to consider whether the question is
presented in appropriate proceedings." Id. at 213, 61 N.E.2d at 515. One year after Bull v.
Stichman, in Lederman v. Board of Educ., 196 Misc. 873, 95 N.Y.S.2d 114 (Sup. Ct. 1949),
rev'd on other grounds, 276 App. Div. 527, 96 N.Y.S.2d 466 (2d Dep't), aff'd sub nom.
Thompson v. Wallin, 301 N.Y. 476, 95 N.E.2d 806 (1950), the court cited Kuhn v. Curran,
supra, stating that "it being vitally important to the public at large .. . that the real
issue herein be speedily determined, the court should not 'pause to consider whether the
question is presented in appropriate proceedings.'" Id. at 877, 95 N.Y.S.2d at 118.
20. 165 App. Div. 449, 150 N.Y. Supp. 933 (Ist Dep't 1914).
21. "With regard to . . . [Heim's] appeal we are not unmindful of the recent expressions
of the Court of Appeals adverse to the maintenance of so-called taxpayers' actions to test
the validity of legislative acts.... In the present case, however, this objection is not raised
by the respondents, and since it is represented to us that the matter is one of great public
exigency, as to which all parties interested seem to desire speedy determination, we have
concluded to pass upon the appeal upon its merits." Id. at 451-52, 150 N.Y. Supp. at 936.
22. Heim v. McCall, 214 N.Y. 629, 108 N.E. 1095 (1915) (memorandum decision).
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went to the Supreme Court of the United States28 where again the issue of
standing was ignored.24
The New York rule on standing follows the reasoning of the United States
Supreme Court in Frothingham v. Mellon,2 5 applying the Frothingham rule at
the state level. In Frothingham the Supreme Court denied Mrs. Frothingham,
a resident of Massachusetts and a United States taxpayer, the right to challenge
the constitutionality of the Federal Maternity Act.20 The only injury alleged
by the plaintiff was that congressional appropriations contemplated under the
Maternity Act would necessarily increase her future federal tax burden. The
Court dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction, 27 reasoning almost precisely
the way the New York Court of Appeals had in Doolittle and Schieffelin.2 8 The
Court called a taxpayer's interest in federal funds de minimis.2 0
Most states today permit the taxpayer to challenge the validity of state
legislation. Jurisdiction is predicated on either (1) a statute authorizing the
23. Helm v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915).
24. "There seems to have been no question raised as to the right of Heim to maintain
the suit, although he is not one of the contractors nor a laborer of the excluded nationality
or citizenship. The Appellate Division felt that there might be objection to the right, under
the holding of a cited case. The Court of Appeals, however, made no comment, and we
must-certainly may-assume that Heim had a right of suit . . . ." Id. at 186-87. The
Supreme Court was here adhering to the rule, later established by Frothingham v. Mellon,
262 U.S. 447 (1923), that if a state permits taxpayers' suits the Court will not decline to
exercise its jurisdiction.
29. 262 U.S. 447 (1923) (Massachusetts v. Mellon).
26. 42 Stat. 224 (1921).
27. "We have reached the conclusion that the cases must be disposed of for want of
jurisdiction without considering the merits of the constitutional questions. The appellant
[Frothingham] . . . has no such interest in the subject-matter, nor is any such Injury
inflicted or threatened, as will enable her to sue." 262 U.S. at 480.
28. "If one taxpayer may champion and litigate such a cause, then every other taxpayer
may do the same, not only in respect of the statute here under review but also in respect
of every other appropriation act and statute whose administration requires the outlay
of public money, and whose validity may be questioned." Id. at 487. "We have no power per
se to review and annul acts of Congress on the ground that they are unconstitutional.
That question may be considered only when the justification for some direct injury suffered
or threatened, presenting a justiciable issue, is made to rest upon such an act. . . . The
party who invokes the power must be able to show . . . that he has sustained or Is
immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and
not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally."
Id. at 488.
29. The interest of a taxpayer "in the moneys of the Treasury . . . is shared with
millions of others; is comparatively minute and indeterminable; and the effect upon future
taxation, of any payment out of the funds, so remote, fluctuating and uncertain, that no
basis is afforded for an appeal to the preventive powers of a court of equity." Id. at 487.
Note, however, that the Supreme Court does permit taxpayer suits on the municipal level.
Crampton v. Zambriskie, 101 U.S. 601 (1879). The reasons given for permitting the
municipal action are based upon the nature of the powers exercised by the municipality, "the
great danger of their abuse and the necessity of prompt action to prevent Irremediable
injuries . . . ." Id. at 609.
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action;30 (2) a refusal to distinguish a municipal taxpayer's suit from a state
taxpayer's action; 31 or (3) the theory that a state taxpayer has an equitable
interest in the state's funds, and when such funds are exhausted the burden of
replenishing them necessarily falls upon the ta-xpayer. 32
In brief, the majority rule is founded upon the proposition that "'a wrongful
and illegal disposal of public funds or property by those who have been en-
trusted with their care and preservation for public purposes, will necessarily
lead to increased rates of taxation to restore the loss, and thereby become the
efficient cause of special and peculiar damage to the taxpayer ... .'"
The court in the instant case made the point that the law of New York
State is "also the law of the United States of America." 3 4 This may indicate
that if the Supreme Court held that a United States taxpayer has standing
to challenge a congressional appropriation, New York would follow suit on
the state level. A federal decision to this effect would require an overruling
or ignoring of Frothingiam.
New York's adherence to the principles of Schieffelin v. Kornfort, and the
Supreme Court's adherence to Frothtingham, have been criticizedi on the
grounds that the "reasons relied on by the Supreme Court... are contrary to
. . . our present tax system . . . ,.3" that state law is almost uniformly opposed
to the doctrine,3 7 and that "the fact that the Supreme Court before developing
the Frothingham doctrine upheld the standing of federal taxpayers shows that
nothing in the Constitution compels the denial of such standing .... 38
30. See State v. Yelle, 52 Wash. 2d 856, 329 P.2d 841 (1958) (en banc) (where the
state attorney general refused to challenge the validity of a statute, a taxpayer could do
so); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 29, § 63 (1961).
31. See Turnipseed v. Blan, 226 Ala. 548, 148 So. 116 (1933); Fergus v. Russell, 270 11.
304, 110 N.E. 130 (1915). Fergus is the leading case for the majority rule in this country.
There a taxpayer sought to have certain provisions of an omnibus bill passed by the
state legislature declared unconstitutional. The court permitted the suit because a taxpayer
could challenge the validity of a municipal expenditure and the court saw no reason to
deny a state taxpayer the same right. Id. at 315, 110 N.E. at 136. Another reason for the
court's decision that the taxpayer could maintain the action was his equitable ownership
in state funds. Id. at 314, 110 N.E. at 135.
32. See Farrell v. Oliver, 146 Ark. 599, 226 S.W. 529 (1921); Turkovich v. Board
of Trustees, 11 Ill. 2d 460, 143 N.E.2d 229 (1957); Rein v. Johnson, 149 Neb. 67, 30 N.W.2d
548 (1947); Schilito v. City of Spartanburg, 214 S.C. 11, 51 S.E.2d 95 (1948).
33. Annot, 131 A.L.R. 1230 (1941).
34. 13 N.Y.2d at 76, 192 N.E.2d at 15, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 44.
35. 3 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 22.09 (1958).
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid. Professor Davis was probably referring to Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 US. 291
(1899), where an action brought by a citizen and taxpayer to enjoin the Treasurer of the
United States from allocating funds to the directors of a hospital, on the ground that
the act authorizing the agreement to make payment was unconstitutional. The Court
overlooked the issue of standing and decided the case on its merits. "Pasing the various
objections made to the maintenance of this suit on account of an alleged defect of parties,
and also in regard to the character in which the complainant sues, merely that of a
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A review of the Court's decisions in the "prayer cases" 39 leads one to infer
that the Supreme Court is now merely paying lip service to the doctrine of
standing. Prior to Engel v. Vitale40 a petitioner had to show either some pecuni-
ary loss 4 1 or an invasion of personal liberty42 to maintain an action in the federal
courts. The petitioners in Engel were residents and taxpayers of New York. It
was granted that they suffered no pecuniary loss, and the Supreme Court ap-
peared satisfied that no coercion existed.43 Although the question of petitioners'
standing was not discussed by the Court, it may well be that Engel marks the
beginning of the end of Frothingham:4
4
One finds asserted in Engel [and Schempp] no requirement that a litigant, if he would
invoke judicial power to forbid governmental action, must show that by it he "has
sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result
of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common
with people generally."'45
The majority in the instant case-quoting from Schieffelin-equated the
standing issue with the doctrine of political questions. 40 But is not the prognosis
for the doctrine of political questions rather poor-at least on the federal
level-after the Supreme Court's decision in Baker v. Carr?47 The very issue
which had been labeled a "political question" in Colegrove v. Green48 was there
decided by the Court, albeit with a shadowy though traditional distinguishing
of Colegrove. In Baker v. Carr, suit was brought by a group of Tennessee voters
who sought a declaration that a state statute providing for the apportionment
of the state legislature was unconstitutional. Plaintiffs contended that by
reason of the shifting of population centers over the years the statutory appor-
tionment not only was obsolete but also operated to deprive them of equal
voting rights contrary to the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. The lower courts dismissed on the authority of Colegrove. Mr. Justice
citizen and taxpayer of the United States . . . we come to the main question .... " Id.
at 295.
39. School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) ; Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
40. Supra note 39.
41. See, e.g., Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952).
42. See, e.g., Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
43. "[T]here is no element of compulsion or coercion in New York's regulation requir-
ing that public schools be opened each day with . . . [a] prayer .... " 370 U.S. 421, 438
(1962) (concurring opinion).
44. The facts in the Schempp case were quite similar to those in Engel, and again the
Court decided the case on its merits. The only mention made of the Issue of standing Is
found in a footnote to the majority opinion. "It goes without saying that the laws and
practices involved here can be challenged only by persons having standing to complain."
374 U.S. 224 n.9.
45. Sutherland, Establishment According to Engel, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 25, 26-27 (1962).
46. "Jurisdiction has never been directly conferred upon the courts to supervise the acts
of other departments of government." 13 N.Y.2d at 76, 192 N.E.2d at 16, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 45.
47. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
48. 328 U.S. 549 (1946) (Illinois residents sought to have declared invalid a statute
apportioning the state's congressional districts).
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Frankfurter had said in Colegrove, inter alia, that the Court lacked jurisdiction
because of the political nature of the controversy. Baker v. Carr was almost
a complete reversal of the Colegrove rule. It would be most difficult, if not face-
tious, to attempt to distinguish the two cases. Mr. Justice Brennan in Baker
purported to do so. But the question remains whether he really meant what he
said when he spoke of distinctions.
Speaking for the majority in the present case, Judge Burke noted that New
York courts "have always held that the constitutionality of a State statute
may be tested only by one personally aggrieved thereby. ... ,,49 The validity
of Judge Burke's statement is questionable. In cases involving nonfiscal matters
the court has allowed a taxpayer to maintain his action even though not per-
sonally aggrieved. 50 It is fair to say that in the nonfiscal area the New York
courts tend to overlook the doctrine of standing. 51
If the New York taxpayer cannot judicially challenge legislative expenditures
his only remedy is found in the voting booth. Is this an adequate or reasonable
remedy? On election day a legislator's vote on a particular appropriation bill
may be a thing of the distant past, long forgotten.
Judge Fuld, dissenting in the instant case, argued that continued adherence
to the minority rule can lead to nothing but citizen apathy in public affairs. 12
His reasoning supposes that a civic interest is to be measured by litigious activity,
a proposition which is palpably defective.
Judge Dye in his dissenting opinion seems to have posed the problem, and the
answer as well, more realistically:
If a choice is to be made between constitutional observance and a rule such as
Doolittle ... and Schieffelin ... the choice should and must be the Constitution....
When wrong is threatened or actually accomplished, every taxpayer suffers a loss,
for in the end it is his pocketbook that must bear the ultimate burden. The personal
monetary interest should not be the test, but whether, in fact, the Constitution of
the State of New York is being flouted.53
Although Judge Dye's conclusion would be the demise of the doctrine of stand-
49. 13 N.Y.2d at 76, 192 N.E.2d at 15-16, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 44.
50. See Kuhn v. Curran, 294 N.Y. 207, 61 N.E.2d 513 (1945); Andresen v. Rice, 277
N.Y. 271, 14 N.E.2d 65 (1938). In Andresen, petitioner sought an order of mandamus to
direct the Civil Service Commission of New York to classify the position of state trooper
in the competitive class of the Division of Police. He contended that the authority given
by a legislative act to the superintendent of police, to fix qualifications and to pass upon
the standing of applicants, was unconstitutional. The court stated: "The point has been
raised that the petitioner here is not capable of presenting this matter to the court, as
he has not applied for a position on the force. He is of age to make such application,
but, more than that, he is a citizen and resident of the State of New York, and, being
such, is capable of presenting to the courts his petition. . . ." Id at 281, 14 N.E2d at 69.
51. Cash v. Bates, 301 N.Y. 258, 93 N.E.2d 835 (1950) ; Andresen v. Rice, supra note 50.
52. "The apathy of the average citizen concerning public affairs has often been decried;
under the court-made rule now reaffirmed, it is being compelled." 13 N.Y.2d at 81, 192
N.E.2d at 19, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 48.
53. 13 N.Y.2d at 81-82, 192 N.E.2d at 19, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 49.
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ing in New York, if it be true that the other branches of government are re-
luctant to correct unconstitutional exercises of power, 4 is it not the lesser
of two evils?
Warranty-Nonnegligent Airplane Assembler Held Liable for Wrongful
Death of Passenger Not in Privity.-A wrongful death action resulting from
an airplane crash was brought by plaintiff's administratrix against the assembler
of the airplane (Lockheed) and the manufacturer of its altimeter (Kolisman)
for breach of their respective implied warranties of marketability and fitness.,
The defective altimeter was alleged to have caused the fatal crash. The New
York Supreme Court dismissed the complaint and the appellate division af-
firmed.2 The court of appeals in a four-to-three decision held that the airplane
assembler's implied warranty of fitness ran in favor of the passenger despite the
lack of privity of contract. Stating that such recovery afforded the plaintiff
adequate protection, the court further held that it was not necessary to hold
the manufacturer of the defective part liable on its warranty. Goldberg v.
Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d
592 (1963).
Originally, a manufacturer was not liable for damages resulting from his
negligence unless he had personally contracted with the injured party.3 A
distinction was later recognized between an act of negligence "imminently dan-
gerous to the lives of others ' 4 and one that was not. In the former case, the
negligent party was liable to the injured party, whether or not there was a
contract between them; in the latter, the negligent party was liable only to
the one with whom he had contracted, on the ground that "negligence is a
54. "Yet who will chide a court for having dared to right a serious and long-standing
wrong when the Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government had defaulted in
their prior and paramount duty to provide a remedy?" N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1963, p. 22,
col. 5.
1. On the theory of negligence, the action originally joined the air carrier as a defendant.
The suit was discontinued after the appellate division affirmed special term's dismissal of
the complaint. 12 App. Div. 2d 906, 214 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1st Dep't 1961) (memorandum
decision).
2. 23 Misc. 2d 215, 199 N.Y.S.2d 134 (Sup. Ct. 1960), aff'd mem., 12 App. Div. 2d 906,
214 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1st Dep't 1961).
3. Mayor of Albany v. Cunliff, 2 N.Y. 165 (1849). "If A. builds a wagon and sells It
to B., who sells it to C., and C. hires it to D., who in consequence of the gross negligence
of A. in building the wagon is overturned and injured, D. cannot recover damages against
A., the builder. A.'s obligation to build the wagon faithfully, arises solely out of hIs
contract with B. The public have nothing to do with it. Misfortune to third persons, not
parties to the contract, would not be a natural and necessary consequence of the builder's
negligence; and such negligence is not an act imminently dangerous to human life." Thomas
v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397, 408 (1852).
4. Id. at 410.
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breach of the contract."5 Thus, Timas v. Winchester held the manufacturer
of an erroneously labeled poison liable to an injured party not in privity,7 while
in Loop v. Litchfield,s where the manufacturer brought the buyer's attention
to the product's defect and sold it at a reduced rate, he escaped liability to a
subsequent user.9 However, in Devlin v. Smith,'0 the manufacturer of a scaffold,
who was unaware of the defect, was held liable to one not in privity on the
theory that he owed a duty of proper diligence in construction. 1' The court of
appeals in MacPherson v. Buick Motor CoY' held the manufacturer of an
automobile liable in negligence to a subsequent user, with whom he was not
in privity, for damages sustained when the automobile collapsed as the result
of a defective wheel. Although Buick had purchased the wheel from another
manufacturer, it could have uncovered the defect by reasonable inspection.13
The issue was whether the defendant owed a duty of care to anyone but the
immediate purchaser. The court decided to extend the doctrine of Thomas v.
Winchester14 to cover "a thing [the nature of which] is that it is reasonably
certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently made. .. .
5. Ibid.
6. 6 N.Y. 397 (1852).
7. Ibid. The action was brought by a husband and wife to recover damages for in-
juries sustained from the defendant's putting up, labeling and selling as the extract of
dandelion (a simple and harmless medicine) a jar of the extract of belladonna (a deadly
poison). Although defendant here was a remote vendor, he was held liable to the
plaintiffs because his negligence put human life in imminent danger. A falsely labeled
poison is likely to injure anyone into whose possession it comes. Since the danger can be
foreseen, there is a duty of special care to prevent the injury.
8. 42 N.Y. 351 (1870).
9. Ibid. The case involved a defect in a small balance wheel used on a circular saw.
Over four years after the sale the wheel broke, and plaintiff's intestate was killed while
using the machine with the buyer's consent. The court held that the manufacturer was
not answerable to the plaintiff because the bursting of the wheel and the injury to human
life were neither the natural result nor the expected consequence of the manufacture and
sale of the wheel.
10. 89 N.Y. 470 (1882).
11. Ibid. Defendant was a contractor who built a scaffold for a painter. Plaintiff's
intestate, an employee of the painter, was injured when the scaffold collapsed as a result
of improper construction. The contractor was held liable on the theory that he knew that
the scaffold, if improperly constructed, was a dangerous trap. He knew that it %as to be
used by workmen other than his immediate purchaser. Consequently, he owed them
a duty to use proper diligence in construction, independently of his contract with the
painter.
12. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
13. It was not claimed that Buick knew of the defect and wilfully concealed it. The
charge was in negligence rather than fraud. Id. at 385, ill N.E. at 1051.
14. This case dispensed with the privity requirement when the injury resulted from
"things which in their normal operation are implements of destruction ...." Id. at 389,
111 N.E. at 1053.
15. Ibid. Judge Cardozo, writing for the majority, stated that "it is a thing of danger.
Its nature gives warning of the consequences to be expected. If to the element of danger
there is added knowledge that the thing will be used without new tests, then, irrespective
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When the purchaser is unable to prove negligence"0 his alternative is to sue
for breach of either an express or an implied warranty that the product is
fit for the purpose intended, the obvious advantage being that the plaintiff
is not required to prove negligence on the defendant's part.
For many years, if the injured party was not the purchaser, we was unable
to sue for breach of warranty. The leading New York case was Chysky v.
Drake Bros.,'7 where the defendant baked a nail into one of its cakes, with
the result that the plaintiff was injured when she bit into the cake. Plaintiff
was not the purchaser, but his employee. 18 She sought recovery under the
statutory warranty set forth in Section 96 of the New York Personal Property
Law, on the theory that the vendor of food warrants that it is fit for human
consumption, and that the warranty inures to her benefit.19
The court distinguished the case from MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,2 0
noting that recovery in MacPherson was based on defendant's negligence. Plain-
tiff in Chysky limited her right to recover to breach of warranty, despite the
fact that there was no privity of contract between herself and the defendant.
Absent this contractual relationship, the court found no authority on which to
base an award in favor of plaintiff, and accordingly dismissed the complaint."'
of contract, the manufacturer of this thing of danger is under a duty to make it carefully."
Ibid.
16. The plaintiff suing on a negligence theory in a products liability case must usually
rely on res ipsa loquitur, since he rarely has any direct proof as to what caused the
defect in the product. In order to recover, however, the plaintiff must show the particular
negligent act which resulted in his injury. Manley v. New York Tel. Co., 303 N.Y. 18,
100 N.E.2d 113 (1951). Since the product ordinarily passes through the hands of many
dealers, this may make recovery in negligence impossible. See Hardie v. Charles P. Boland
Co., 205 N.Y. 336, 98 N.E. 661 (1912); Jacobs v. Childs Co., 166 N.Y. Supp. 798 (New
York Munic. Ct. 1916). Another obstacle to the plaintiff is that the inference of negligence
may often be rebutted by evidence showing the precautions taken by the defendant In
handling the product. See Shepard v. Beck Bros., Inc., 131 Misc. 164, 225 N.Y. Supp. 438
(New York City Ct. 1927).
17. 235 N.Y. 468, 139 N.E. 576 (1923).
18. Plaintiff was employed by the purchaser as a waitress for a weekly salary with
board and lodging furnished. Id. at 470-71, 139 N.E. at 577.
19. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 96 provides: "[T]here is no implied warranty or condition
as to the quality of fitness for any particular purpose of goods supplied under a contract
to sell or a sale, except as follows: 1. Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes
known to the seller the particular purpose for which the goods are required, and It appears
that the buyer relies on the seller's skill or judgment (whether he be the grower or
manufacturer or not), there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be reasonably fit
for such purpose."
20. 235 N.Y. at 473, 139 N.E. at 578.
21. There is no reference to privity within the statute itself. The section speaks only In
terms of buyer and seller and adopts the contractual concept, specifically stating that there
are no implied warranties of quality as set forth. Judge McLaughlin, writing for the
majority, noted: "If there were an implied warranty which inured to the benefit of the
plaintiff it must be because there was some contractual relation between her and the de-
fendant and there was no such contract. She never saw the defendant, and so far as
appears, did not know from whom her employer purchased the cake. The general rule Is
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Despite undercurrents of dissatisfaction in lower court cases, the rule of
Chysky v. Drake Bros. remained unchanged until the 1961 decision in Green-
berg v. Lorenz. 22 There the child of a purchaser of a can of salmon was allowed
to recover against the manufacturer for breach of an implied warranty of fitness
for consumption. The appellate division had denied recovery,2 but the court
of appeals reviewed the case law in depth- 4 and concluded: "Our difficulty is
not in finding the applicable rule but in deciding whether or not to change it.
The decisions are clear enough."'25 Noting that approximately twenty states had
abolished the requirement of privity,20 the court cited the Uniform Commercial
Code § 2-31827 as further evidence of the widespread criticism of the privity
requirement. 28
that a manufacturer or seller of food, or other articles of personal property, is not liable
to third persons, under an implied warranty, who have no contractual relations with him.
The reason for this rule is that privity of contract does not exist between the seller and
such third persons, and unless there be privity of contract, there can be no implied
warranty. The benefit of a warranty, either expressed or implied, does not run with a
chattel on its resale, and in this respect is unlike a covenant running with the land so as
to give a subsequent purchaser a right of action against the original seller on a warranty."
235 N.Y. at 472-73, 139 N.E. at 577-78.
22. 9 N.Y.2d 195, 173 N.E.2d 773, 213 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1961).
23. The lower court decided that the Chysky ruling was still the law, and that it forbade
a recovery on warranty to anyone hut the purchaser. Consequently, it granted judgment
to the father for his expenses, but dismissed the child's own suit for damages. 7 App. Div.
2d 968, 103 N.Y.S.2d 46 (1st Dep't 1959).
24. The court noted that since a warranty is an "incident of a contract of sale, and does
not run with the chattel on resale," the only warranty is to the original buyer. 9 N.Y.2d
at 198-99, 173 N.E.2d at 774-75, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 41 (citing Chysky v. Drake Bros., 235 N.Y.
468, 139 N.E. 576 (1923)). Certain cases, however, had allowed recovery where the
purchaser could be considered the agent of the injured third party. Ibid. (citing Ryan v.
Progressive Grocery Stores, 255 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E. 105 (1931) (wife buying food for
her husband considered his agent); Bowman v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 264 N.Y. 390, 191
N.E. 27 (1934) (two sisters in same household; sister who bought food considered agent of
one who did not)).
25. 9 N.Y.2d at 198, 173 N.E.2d at 774, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 41.
26. Id. at 199, 173 N.E.2d at 775, 213 N.Y.S. at 41.
27. New York Uniform Commercial Code § 2-318 provides: "A seller's warranty whether
express or implied extends to any natural person who is in the family or household of his
buyer or who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use,
consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the
warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section." The Uniform
Commercial Code was adopted in New York State in 1962, effective September 27, 1964.
28. 9 N.Y.2d at 199, 173 N.E.2d at 775, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 41-42. At least six jurisdictions
with statutes similar to New York's Personal Property Law § 96 had recognized strict
liability for breach of warranty in food cases without the benefit of additional legislation.
Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 14 Cal. 2d 272, 93 P.2d 799 (1939); Patargias v. Coca-
Cola Bottling Co., 332 11. App. 117, 74 N.E.2d 162 (1947); Davis v. Van Camp Packing
Co., 189 Iowa 775, 176 N.W. 382 (1920); Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App.
475, 161 N.E. 577 (1928); Nock v. Coca-Cola Bottling Works, 102 Pa. Super. 515, 156 Ati.
537 (1931); Nelson v. West Coast Dairy Co., 5 Wash. 2d 284, 105 P.2d 75 (1940).
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The court found authority to modify the privity requirement by accepting
the premise that the rule itself was of judicial making, since section 96 did
not mention privity.29 Believing that justice demanded change, but aware of
the need for caution, it adopted the attitude of taking only "one step at a
time."13 0 Limiting itself to the particular facts of the case, the court declared:
Today when so much of our food is bought in packages it is not just or sensible to
confine the warranty's protection to the individual buyer. At least as to food and
household goods, the presumption should be that the purchase was made for all
members of the household. 3 '
Despite this confining language, the rule was further extended in Randy
Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co.3 2 Food was not involved, but the
question of privity was again in issue. American Cyanamid, a manufacturer of
chemical resins, represented in public advertisements and direct mail, and on
labels attached to clothing, that fabrics treated with its "Cyana" finish would
not shrink or stretch out of fit. In an action for breach of an express warranty,
the manufacturer was held liable to a remote purchaser when the product did
not prove true to its claims. Privity was deemed immaterial.33
In many cases, the court noted, the manufacturer will ultimately be held
accountable for the falsity of his representations, but only after an expensive,
time-consuming and wasteful process of litigation. In allowing direct recovery
on the warranty, therefore, the court was but obliging the manufacturer "'to
shoulder the responsibility which should have been his in the first instance.' "34
The New York State Law Revision Commission had unsuccessfully urged adoption of
legislation designed to extend the implied warranties created by § 96 to the buyer's em-
ployees and members of his household. N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65(J), p. 5 (1943); N.Y. Leg.
Doc. No. 65(A), p. 5(1945); N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65(B), p. 5 (1959). This was noted by
the court, 9 N.Y.2d at 199, 173 N.E.2d at 775, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 41, and, it has been sug-
gested, may have influenced its decision. See Redlich, Commercial Law, 35 N.Y.U.L. Rev.
319, 323-28 (1960).
29. 9 N.Y.2d at 199-200, 173 N.E.2d at 775, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 42. Originally, an action
for breach of warranty was in tort. See Prosser, Torts § 83, at 493 (2d ed. 1955);
1 Williston, Sales § 195, at 502 (rev. ed. 1948).
30. 9 N.Y.2d at 200, 173 N.E.2d at 776, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 42.
31. Ibid.
32. 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962).
33. Commenting on the history of the privity rule, the court observed that "the world
of merchandising is, in brief, no longer a world of direct contract; it is rather, a world of
advertising . . . ." Id. at 12, 181 N.E.2d at 402, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 367. The court reasoned
that when a manufacturer places his product on the market, advertises and labels It, lie
is representing its quality to the public in such a way as to induce reliance upon his
representations. Unquestionably, he intends the product to be purchased and used In
reliance upon his express assurance of its quality. In fact, it is so purchased and used. The
manufacturer should not then be permitted to avoid responsibility when the expected use
leads to injury and loss, by claiming that he made no contract directly with the user. As
a result, the court felt that "the policy of protecting the public from injury, physical or
pecuniary, resulting from misrepresentations outweighs allegiance to an old and out-moded
technical rule of law . . . ." Id. at 13, 181 N.E.2d at 402, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 368.
34. Id. at 13, 181 N.E.2d at 403, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 368 quoting Hamon v. Digliani, 148
Conn. 710, 717, 174 A.2d 294, 297 (1961).
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In again concluding that the privity rule should be modified, the court of
appeals insisted that it was doing "nothing more or less than carrying out an
historic and necessary function of the court to bring the law into harmony
with modern-day needs and with concepts of justice and fair dealing."' 1a
Thomas v. Leary,3 6 a recent appellate division decision involving a nonfood
product, exemplifies the increasingly liberal attitude of the courts. The issue
there was whether an employee of a purchaser had a cause of action against
a seller for damages caused by the collapse of a dental chair. The court felt that
it could not legitimately distinguish the Greenberg case. It viewed the cautious
words of Greenberg as allowing relaxation beyond the particular facts of that
case, and deemed the case before it but "a logical and progressive step at this
time."37
It is interesting to note the time sequence involved. First the appellate
division in the instant case dismissed the causes of action based on warranty.3,
Then the court of appeals passed on Greenberg and Randy Knitwear. There-
upon, leave to appeal to the court of appeals was granted in the instant case for
the express purpose of taking "another step toward a complete solution of the
problem partially cleared up" in the foregoing cases.39 With this in mind, Chief
Judge Desmond, writing for the majority, indicated that the previous decisions
have "at least suggested that all requirements of privity have been dispensed
with in our state."40 He continued:
A breach of warranty, it is now clear, is not only a violation of the sales contract
out of which the warranty arises but is a tortious wrong suable by a noncontracting
party whose use of the warranted article is within the reasonable contemplation
of the vendor or manufacturer.4'
Aware that the Greenberg decision sharply limited itself to the facts of that
particular case, and cognizant of the "step by step" approach of the cases,42
the court held:
[A]t least where an article is of such a character that when used for the purpose
for which it is made it is likely to be a source of danger to several or many people
if not properly designed and fashioned, the natnufacturer as well as the vendor is
35. 11 N.Y2d at 16, 181 N.E.2d at 404, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 370.
36. 15 App. Div. 2d 438, 225 N.Y.S.2d 137 (4th Dep't 1962).
37. Id. at 440, 225 N.Y.S.2d at 139. By way of limitation the court added: "By our
determination we do not intend to hold that such warranty would necessarily extend to
any person who might use the article involved. We are fully aware that any extension of
the existing principles of privity will add to the present burden on retailers and others. The
answer is that the statutory obligations now impose burdens and reasonable judicial interpre-
tation of the statutory language must be expected. Also, the seller by choosing responsible
suppliers may protect himself to some extent, at least, against claims for breach of
warranty." Id. at 443, 225 N.Y.S.2d at 142.
38. 12 App. Div. 2d 906, 214 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1st Dep't 1961) (memorandum decision).
39. 12 N.Y.2d at 434, 191 N.E.2d at 81, 240 N.YS.2d at 593.
40. Id. at 435-36, 191 N.E.2d at 82, 240 N.Y..2d at 594.




liable, for breach of law-implied warranties, to the person whose use is contem-
plated.43
In noting that "the MacPherson holding was an 'extension' of existing court-
made liability law" and that the Greenberg and Randy Knitwear decisions repre-
sented "extensions in favor of noncontracting consumers," the majority further
stated that it was "no extension at all to include airplanes and the passengers
for whose use they are built . . .44
Taking into account the systematic confinement and the near elimination of
the privity doctrine in other states,45 the court here accepted the view recently
expressed by the Supreme Court of California" that
the costs of injuries resulting from defective products [should be] . . . borne by the
manufacturers who put the products on the market rather than by the injured
persons who are powerless to protect themselves [and] that implicit in putting
such articles on the market are representations that they will safely do the job for
which they are built.47
It is interesting to note the reasoning used by the instant court to excuse
the manufacturer of the defective part from liability to the injured plaintiff:
However, for the present at least we do not think it necessary so to extend this rule
as to hold liable the manufacturer (defendant Kollsman) of a component part.
Adequate protection is provided for the passengers by casting in liability the
airplane manufacturer which put into the market the completed aircraft. 48
Randy Knitwear, Greenberg and Thomas were distinguished on their facts in
the dissenting opinion of Judge Burke. In those cases, the dissent pointed out,
the manufacturer knew the article would not be subject to further inspection.
In the instant case, "federal regulations provide for rigorous inspection and
certification from the Federal Aviation Agency."'4 9 Judge Burke failed to see
any reason why, absent negligence, the assembler of the airplane, rather than
the manufacturer of the defective component part, should be deemed liable to
an injured passenger. Moreover, it was pointed out that "all are aware of the
hazards attending air travel, and accident and special insurance is readily
available at moderate rates."50
43. Id. at 436-37, 191 N.E.2d at 83, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 594-95. (Emphasis added.)
44. Id. at 437, 191 N.E.2d at 83, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 595. In support, the court cited the
following decisions upholding complaints sounding in warranty against aircraft manu-
facturers where passengers lost their lives when the planes crashed: Ewing v. Lockheed
Aircraft Corp., 202 F. Supp. 216 (D. Minn. 1962); Conlon v. Republic Aviation Corp.,
204 F. Supp. 865 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Middleton v. United Aircraft Corp., 204 F. Supp. 856
(S.D.N.Y. 1960); Hinton v. Republic Aviation Corp., 180 F. Supp. 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
45. See generally Jaeger, Privity of Warranty: Has the Tocsin Sounded?, 1 Duquesne
University L. Rev. 1 (1963).
46. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 67, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697 (1962).
47. 12 N.Y.2d at 437, 191 N.E.2d at 83, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 595.
48. Ibid. (Emphasis added.)




Refusing to accept the majority's equation of warranty liability and strict
products liability, he challenged the majority's offhand decision to fasten enter-
prise liability on the assembler alone. The dissenting judges would have fixed
liability upon the airline or not at all. Wrote Judge Burke:
The principle of selection stated is that the injured passenger needs no more
protection. We suggest that this approach to the identification of an appropriate
defendant does not answer the question: Which enterprise should be selected if the
selection is to be in accord with the rationale upon which the doctrine of strict
products liability rests?51
The instant decision illustrates an ever increasing trend, which if carried to
an extreme would guarantee recovery to an injured plaintiff whenever a manu-
facturer has breached his warranty. By allowing the purchaser of a ticket for
passage to recover against the airplane assembler for injuries caused by a faulty
altimeter manufactured by another, the court appeared reluctant to break
radically with the privity of contract rule. Liability seems to have been imposed
on the assembler, rather than the manufacturer of the defective part, merely be-
cause of some closer temporal connection with the plaintiff. At the same time,
the court gave strong indication that had the plaintiff been unable to re-
cover from the assembler, adequate protection would not have been afforded,
and in the interest of justice it would have been necessary to fix liability on
the allegedly negligent manufacturer of the altimeter.
The approach of the court in adhering to the "step by step" method of
decision while simultaneously adopting an arbitrary principle of selection ap-
pears open to question. By avoiding direct confrontation of the question
of whether any semblance of privity is required for recovery on warranty, the
court extended protection only to the individual financially able to carry his
case to the court of appeals. Paradoxically, the benevolent motives of the court
strongly suggest that ultimately, whenever a plaintiff in a warranty action
can prove that his injury resulted from the conduct of someone else, the courts
will impose absolute liability in the fashion of workmen's compensation statutes.
51. Id. at 440, 191 N.E.2d at 85, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 597.
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